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212 OLIVE PRORA'flON E'fC. COM. v. Amu. E'l'C. COM. [17 C.(2d) 
States, and California growers do not need the benefit of pro-
ration in order to receive maximum returns for their crops. 
But the only issue which the commission could decide in the 
proceeding before it was the sufficiency of the petition. If 
the petition was signed by the requisite number of producers 
and owners of producing factors, it was the duty of the com-
mission, under the law. as then in force, to terminate the 
program regardless of other facts. The evidence sought to 
be introduced by respondents Hughes and Isely would not be 
relevant to that issue even if it might be received at this late 
date. 
[9] As another ground justifying its action, the commis-
sion asserts that its last order should be upheld because the 
evidence upon which it is based, although received after the 
conclusion of the hearing, may be reviewed in the judicial 
proceeding authorized by the act. To approve such a prac-
tice would mean that an administrative body could base a 
finding and order 'on information or reports secretly received 
without the knowledge of the parties, and successfully defend 
that action by answering that the remedy of the one aggrieved 
by the decision is to challenge the data or evidence in a later 
judicial proceeding. That is not the procedure provided for 
by the statute. .::t 
The motion to take additional evidence is denied. Let a 
writ of mandate issue requiring the respondent commission to 
annul its orders of July 26 and August 7, 1939. 
Traynor, J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Peters, J., pro tem., 
and Ward, J., pro tem., concurred. 
Gibson, C. J., deeming himself disqualified, does not par-
ticipate in this decision. 
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WORTHINGTON AMES et al., Appellants, v. EMPIRE 
STAR MINES COMPANY, LTD., et al., Respondents. 
[1] Mines and Minerals-Estate and Rights of Locator-Subsur-
face Rights-Extralateral Rights.-Congress intended by the 
Mining Act of July 26, 1866 (14 U. S. Stat. at Largs, 
251) to recognize and give legal validity to all existing min-
ing claims in accordance with local rule, custom and regu-
lation, including extralateral rights in those lands to which 
such rules and regulations applied. 
[2] Id. - Estate and Rights of Locator - Subsurface Rights _ 
Extralateral Rights-Limitations.-Under the Mining Act of 
July 26, 1866, a patentee acquired the legal title to extralateral 
rights, provided they had not previously been conveyed away 
by the government, for such acts could not divest private 
owners of existing vested rights. 
[3] Public Lands-Disposal of Pederal Public Domain-Grants to 
Railroads-Lands Included-Mineral Land.-By the Railroad 
Grant Act of July 25, 1866, Congress did not intend to vest 
in a railroad the title to any mineral lands of the United 
States. And the railroad grant did not pass title to the sub-
surface of land which was clearly mineral, and known to be 
such at the time the patent was issued, where there was no 
final and definite location of land by the railroad until the 
securing of a patent, and where at that time extralateral rights 
of adjoining mines had vested. And this is true despite the 
fact that this act was passed one day earlier than the Min-
ing Act of July 26, 1866. 
[4] Mines and Minerals-Land Subject to Mineral Location-Rail_ 
road Grant-Time When Mineral Right Obtainable.-Mineral 
lands being excepted from the grant to railroads under the 
Railroad Grant Act of July 25, 1866, title thereto can be ac-
quired as against the railroad subsequent to the enactment of 
such act and at any time up to the date of the patent. 
3. See 22 R. C. L. 291. 
McK. Dig. References: 1. Mines and Minera!:;, § 47; 2, 5, 9. 
Mines and Minerals, § 47 (2); 3. Public Lands, § 144 (4); 4. Mines 
and Mlnerals, § 7; 6. Public Lands, § 183; 7. Property, § 5; 8. Pub-
lic Lands, § 14 (3); 10. Mines and Minerals, § 119; 11. Mines and 
Minerals, § 74; 12, 13. Mines and Minerals, § 57; 14. Evidence, 
§ 271; 15, 16, 17. Mines and Minerals, § 138 (2). 
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[5] Id.-Estate and Rights of Locator-Subsurface Rights-Ex:-
tralateral Rights-Patent to Agricultural Land.-An agricul-
tural patent issued merely on the basis of an ex parte hearing 
on the part of the claimant to the land can in no way abro-
gate the existing vested extralateral rights of parties who had 
nothing to do with the proceeding. 
[6] Public Lands-Disposal of Federal Domain-Patents-Opera-
tion and Effect.-The government cannot convey away land 
which is no longer owned, and a patent cannot cut off pre-
viously existing vested rights in the patented property. 
[7] Property-Title, Ownership and possession-In General-Sub-
surface.-The title to the surface may be in one person and 
the title to the subsurface in another. 
[8] Public Lands-School and University Lands-In General-
Lands Included-Mineral Lands-Effect of Certification by 
Register. _ Under 14 U. S. Stat. at Large, 251, granting 
school lands but excepting mineral lands, the state does 
not acquire a fee simple to the subsurface of land where 
at the time of the survey extraterritorial rights of adjoining 
mining claims had vested. A certification by the register of 
the United States Land Office that there was no claim or filing 
on certain lands other than that of the state is not effective as 
against existing vested extralateral rights therein. 
[9] Mines and Minerals-Estate and Rights of Locator-Subsur- :! 
face Rights-Extralateral Rights-Length of Claim-Applica-
tion of Statute.-The Mining Act of 1872 (see 30 U. S. C. A., 
sec. 23), restricting future mining claims asserting extralateral 
rights to a maximum of 1500 feet along a vein, does not apply 
to a patent secured at a later date, when issued in pursuance 
of the Mining Act of July 26, 1866, on the basis of an earlier 
location. 
[10] Id.._patents_Conclusiveness-Collateral Attack.-Where a 
patented mining claim exceeds 1500 feet as the result of the 
consolidation of several original claIms, the lines thereof need 
not be shown to establish the validity of the patent on collat-
eral attack. 
[11] Id.-Transfers and Conveyances-Deeds-Estoppel.-Where 
. the grantee of land takes under a deed containing a reserva-
tion to the grantor and his assigns of the right to follow a 
vein of ore beneath the surface and to mine therefrom, a suc-
cessor in interest of the grantor can successfully assert such 
reserved right although the mine was never patented, and 
although it had been abandoned and relocated after the issu-
ance of a patent to such granted land. 
[12] Id.. _ Abandonment, Forfeiture and Annual Work-Annual 
Work _ Effect of Nonperformance.-The title to a mining 
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claim does not terminate on the failure to perform annual 
labor. The intervention of a third party and a relocation of 
the ground must occur before any forfeiture can take place. 
[13] Id.-Abandonment, Forfeiture and Annual Work-Annual 
Work-Effect of Nonperformance - Who may Urge.-The 
grantee under a deed reserving to the grantor and his assigns 
the right to follow and mine from a vein cannot, by reason 
of such reservation, take advantage of any forfeiture and sub-
sequent relocation of the mining claim to which such reserved 
right is appurtenant. 
[14] Evidence - Hearsay - Exceptions to Rule-Character and 
Reputation-Boundaries.-The rule that evidence of common 
reputation existing previous to the controversy may be in-
troduced to prove the existence of boundaries and facts of a 
public or general interest more than thirty years old applies 
to the original location of a mine, particularly on government 
land. (See Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1870.) 
[15] Mines and Minerals-Actions and Proceedings-General Con-
siderations - Admissibility of Evidence - Documentary Evi-
dence.-In proof of the proper location and existence of min-
ing claims, a party may introduce patent records containing 
abstracts of title to the mining claim, recitals as to location 
of the claims in ancient deeds, verified statements as to the 
location and possession of the mine, a copy of the articles of 
incorporation of the early mining corporation, a certified copy 
of the minutes of meetings of the Quartz Miriers of the 
Valley, descriptions of the claims by metes and bounds, the 
registrar's final certificate of entry of the fact, and the field 
notes of survey and report of the United States Deputy Min-
eral Surveyor on the mine. . 
[16] ld.-Actions and Proceedings-General Considerations-Ad-
missibility of Evidence-Documentary Evidence-Official Re-
ports.-The official report of the Mineral Resources of the 
Public Domain of the West which was published under the 
direct authority of Congress, being an official report to the 
secretary of the treasury, is admissible to show the location 
and working of mines in pursuance to the miners' rules and 
regulations then in existence. 
[17] ld.-Actions and Proceedings-General Considerations-Ad-
missibility of Evidence-Documentary Evidence-Histories.-
The History of Yuba County by Chamberlain and Wells 
(1879) is admissible under Code of Civil Procedure, section 
1936, to prove the location of a mining claim, inasmuch as 
evidence of general reputation is competent for such pur-
pose. 
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Yuba 
County. Warren Steel, Judge. Affirmed. 
Simeon E. Sheffey and Richard Belcher for Appellants. 
Robert M. Searls, Jones & l!'innegan and William E. Colby, 
for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-This controversy is between the owners of 
mining property, known as the Pennsylvania and Jefferson 
mines, upon whose land there is the outcropping of a 'gold-
bearing quartz vein, and the owners of non-mineral surface 
land, known as the .Ames Tract, beneath the surface of which 
this vern dips. The latter, as plaintiffs, brought suit for 
an injunction to prevent defendants, the owners of the Penn-
sylvania and Jefferson mines, from following and mining 
this vein some 500 to 1,000 feet beneath the surface of the 
plaintiffs' land, and for an accounting of minerals previ-
ously extracted. Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the 
superior court in favor of defendants. 
The controversy turns upon the priority of title to the 
subsurface .of the plaintiffs' land. Defendant mine owners 
claim the right to mine extralaterally beneath the plaintiffs' ! 
land by virtue .of the Mining Act of Congress of July 26, 
1866 (14 Stats. at Large 251), which recognized and legal-
ized the right of miners, in accordance with existing miners' 
rules and regulations, t.o follow a vein which had its apex 
upon the surface of their land as it dipped down extralater-
ally beneath the surface of adjoining government land. 
Plaintiffs trace their title back to the Railroad Grant Act 
of July 25, 1866 (14 Stats. at Large 239), by which Con-
gress provided for land grants to the California and Oregon 
Railroad, later the Central Pacific Railroad, but expressly 
excepted mineral lands from the terms of the act. Plaintiffs 
contend that since this act was passed one day earlier than 
the Mining Act, the railroad received a fee-simple title to 
the entire tract, surface and subsurface, so that the Mining 
Act passed the next day could in no way operate t.o confer 
upon the .owners of adjoining mines the right to mine extra-
laterally beneath the land granted to the railroad. 
On June 14, 1880, the Central Pacific Railroad, pursuant 
to its legislative grant, secured a patent to the Ames Tract 
which transformed it from a "float" to an established title 
$ 
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by the definite location of the railroad line. The patent 
stated that the Ames Tract was agricultural land, and plain-
tiffs contend that this patent c.onclusively determined the 
character of the land as non-mineral, and related the title 
back to the date of the Railroad Grant Act of July 25, 1866. 
A patent to the Pennsylvania claim was secured by the de-
fendants' predecessors in interest .on August 18, 1880, pur-
suant to the Mining Act .of JUly 26, 1866. In 1872, Congress 
passed another act relating t.o mines which provided that a 
mining claim, to secure extralateral rights, could equal but 
n.ot exceed 1500 feet along the vein or lode. Plaintiffs assert 
that since the defendants' patent was secured subsequent 
t.o the passage .of this act, it is subject to the provisi.ons 
thereof, and therefore that the owners of the Pennsylvania 
claim, which is 1540 feet along the vein or l.ode, are precluded 
from claiming any extralateral rights. No patent was ever 
secured to the Jefferson claim, which was apparently located 
at the same time as the Pennsylvania claim, abandoned, and 
subsequently relocated. The defendants show that they now 
in effect have full title to it. They also present in evidence 
the deed of the Ames Tract to the plaintiffs from one Ebert, 
the immediate predecess.or in title, which contains a reser-
vation by him, as grantor, of the right to follow the Jeffer-
son vein beneath the surface of the Ames Tract and to mine 
therefrom. This right was subsequently c.onveyed by Ebert 
to the defendants. 
Between the Ames Tract and the Pennsylvania and Jef-
ferson mines there is a narr.ow strip of school land granted 
to the State of Calif.ornia under the Act .of Congress of 
March 3, 1853 (10 Stats. at Large 244), and this grant 
also excepted mineral lands from its terms. Subsequent to 
its final survey in 1867, part of this land ,was conveyed 
to the defendants, the residue remaining in the hands of the 
state as school land. Plaintiffs contend that the state ac-
quired a fee simple in this land, including the subsurface, 
s.o that defendants could have no extralateral rights therein 
and were thus effectively cut off from the Ames Tract. 
Defendants have presented evidence in the form of testi-
mony of old settlers, abstracts of title, patent records, deeds, 
and government reports and surveys to pr.ove the original 
location of both the Pennsylvania and Jefferson claims in 
accordance with the miners' rules and regulations pri.or to 
1863 j the working of these claims, including tbl.il subsurface 
i j 
I iii 
.# ... -.~ 
,j, 
I 
218 AMES v. EMPIRE STAR MINES CO., LTD. [17 C. (2d) 
of the Ames Tract, prior to 1866; the securing of a patent 
to the Pennsylvania mine in 1880, with a continuous chain 
of title to this mine culminating in the present defendants; 
and the securing of full rights by defendants as against all 
existing claims on the Jefferson mine. 
Plaintiffs contend, however, that defendants have not prop-
erly established the original location of the Pennsylvania and 
Jefferson claims, nor compliance by their predecessors in title 
with the miners' rules and regulations necessary to secure 
extralateral rights, nor what the rules and regulations were, 
maintaining that most of the evidence introduced by the 
defendants in these regards is inadmissible as hearsay. 
[1] It is clear that Congress intended by the Mining Act 
of July 26, 1866, to recognize and give legal validity to all 
existing mining claims in accordance with local rules, cus-
toms, and regulations, including extralateral rights in those 
lands to which such rules and regulations applied. (Lind-
ley, Mines [3d ed.], secs. 40-46; Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U. S. 
453 [25 L. Ed. 240] ; St. Louis Smelting <.& Ref. 00. v. Kemp, 
104 U. S.636 [26 L. Ed. 875] ; Morton v.Solwmbo O. M. 00., 
26 Cal. 527.) According to defendants' evidence the Penn-
sylvania and Jefferson mines clearly fall within the compass 
of the act, for prior to its passage their owners located and 
mined the vein running extralaterally under the Ames land. 
[2] Under the act they acquired legal title to such extralat-
eral rights provided such rights had not been previously con-
veyed away by the government, for the Mining Act could 
not, of course, operate to divest private owners of existing 
vested rights. (Lindley, Mines [3d ed.], sec. 611; Amador 
Medean Gold M. 00. v. South Spring Hill Gold M. 00., 36 
Fed. 668 [13 Sawy. 523] ; Davis v. Wiebbold, 139 U. S. 507 
[11 Sup. Ct. 628, 35 L. Ed. 238].) 
The plaintiffs contend that the government had previously 
conveyed away such rights. They cite the Railroad Grant 
Act of July 25, 1866, enacted one day earlier than the Min-
ingAct, which conferred upon the California and Oregon 
Railroad, later the Central Pacific Railroad, title to land over 
which the railroad agreed to construct a line in the future. 
They argue that since in pursuance to this act the Central 
Pacific Railroad did locate on certain land, including the 
Ames Tract, and secure a patent thereto, the full title in 
fee simple passed to the railroad as of July 25, 1866, and 
they regard the legal title as having accrued from that date. 
! 
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(Wisconsin Oentral R. R. ('0. v. Price Oounty, 133 U. S. 496 
[10 Sup. Ct. 341, 33 L. Ed. 687] ; Deseret Salt 00. v. Tarpey, 
142 U. S. 241 [12 Sup. Ct. 158, 35 L. Ed. 999] ; Jatunn v. 
Smith, 95 Cal. 154 [30 Pac. 200].) It is their contention 
that the full title to the Ames Tract was conveyed away prior 
to the passage of the Mining Act of July 26, 1866, so that 
the latter could in no way confer upon the adjoining mines 
extralateral rights in the Ames Tract. 
[3] This argument might seem persuasive except for one 
vital factor. The Railroad Grant Act of July 25, 1866, upon 
which the plaintiffs rely for their original title, specifically 
excepted from its operation all mineral lands. The terms of 
the act make it clear that Congress did not intend to vest 
in the railroad title to any mineral lands of the United States. 
(Ba.rden v. Northern Pacific R. R. 00., 154 U. S. 288 [14 
Sup. Ct. 1030, 38 L. Ed. 992]; United States v. Sweet, 245 
U. S. 563 [38 Sup. Ct. 193, 62 L. Ed. 473] ; Broder v. Natoma 
Water <.& M. 00., 101 U. S. 274 [25 L. Ed. 790] ; Northern 
Pacific R. R. 00. v. Sanders, 166 U. S. 620 [17 Sup. Ct. 671, 
41 L. Ed. 1139] ; McClintock v. Bryden et al., 5 Cal. 97 [63 
Am. Dec. 87].) The subsurface of the Ames Tract being 
clearly mineral could not pass under the terms of the act 
but remained in the government, and the Pennsylvania and 
Jefferson mines received full· extralateral rights to mine 
therein by virtue of the Mining Act of July 26, 1866. (Ibid.) 
Plaintiffs cite Davis v. Weibbold, supra, and Amador Me-
dean Gold Mining 00. v. South Spring Ffill Gold Mining 
00., supra, to uphold their proposition that the Railroad 
Grant Act of July 25, 1866, passed full title to the railroad 
at that time as against any subsequently accruing mining 
claims. These cases, however, hold orily that at the time of 
final and definite location of agricultural or townsite land 
full title therein passes to the grantee as against any mineral 
rights not then known to exist but coming into being at· a 
later time. In the present case there was no final and defi-
nite location of the Ames TrRct by the railroad until the 
securing of the patent in 1880. Under the act of JUly 25, 
1866, it had merely a "floating grant" whereby it might 
secure title to land on which it subsequently located. When 
the Ames Tract was finally and definitely located in 1880 
its subsurface not only was known to be mineral but was 
subject to the vested extralateral rights of the adjoining 
... 
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mines. The holdings of the Amador-Medean and Davis cases 
thus clearly have no application here. 
[4] The patent which definitely located and established the 
railroad's claim stated that the Ames Tract was agricultural 
land. Plaintiffs reason that this statement is conclusive as 
to the ~ature of the land since the time for coming in and 
attacking the patent has long since expired, and conclude 
that since the title to the land secnred by the patent relates 
back to the date of the Railroad Grant Act, the full legal 
title to the Ames Tract had vested in the railroad before the 
conferring of extralateral rights upon the mines. The act 
alone, however, cannot be the source of title to any mineral 
lands. As Justice Field stated in Barden v. Northern Pa-
cific R. R. Co., supra, the Railroad Grant Act of July 25, 
1866, when it excepted mineral lands meant that title to all 
mineral lands was to remain in the United States, and no 
rights to such lands could in any way pass to the railroad. 
The patent issued to the railroad by virtue of the act could 
legally affect only non-mineral land, and the theory which 
relates the title back to the date of the act cannot extend to 
"all mineral lands" excepted from the act in express terms. 
It follows that title to such mineral lands could be acquired 
as against the railroad subsequent to the enactment of the 
Railroad Grant Act, and at any time up to the date of the 
patent. (Barden v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co., supraj 
Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Sanders, supra.) 
[5] Hence, the contentions advanced by plaintiffs can be 
resolved into the theory that the patent to the railroad is 
conclusive as to the agricultural character of the land. In 
support thereof they cite Burke v. Southern Pacific R. R. 
Co., 234 U. S. 669 [34 Sup. Ct. 907, 58 L. Ed. 1527] ; West 
v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 200 [49 Sup. Ct. 138, 73 L. Ed. 
265] ; Davis v. Wiebbold, supra. These cases, however, con-
cern the rights of a mining claim coming into existence after 
the securing of the agricultural patent. They stand for the 
proposition that the patent is conclusive as to the character 
of the land as against mining claims subsequently located. 
Such a patent, however, issued merely on the basis of an 
ex parte hearing on behalf of the claimant to the land can 
in no way abrogate the existing vested extralateral rights of 
parties who had nothing to do with the proceedings. (Law-
son v. U. S. Mining Co., 207 U. S. 1, 16 [28 Sup. Ct. 15, 52 
1;. Ed. 65]; U. S. Mining Co. v. Lawson, 134 Fed. 769, 775, 
~ 
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776; Clark-Montana R. 00. v. Butte etc. 00., 233 Fed. 547, 
556; Butte etc. 00. v. Clark-"l1ontana R. 00., 248 Fed. 609, 
615 [160 C. C. A. 509]; Lindley, Mines [3d ed.], sec. 730, 
p. 1785.) [6] It is well established that the government 
cannot convey away land which it no longer owns and that a 
patent cannot cut off prev.iously existing vested rights in the 
patented property. (Reynolds v. Iron Silver Mining 00., 116 
U. S. 687 [6 Sup. Ct. 601, 29 L. Ed. 774] ; Noyes v. Mantle, 
127 U. S. 348, 353, 354 [8 Sup. Ct. 1132, 32 L. Ed. 168]; 
Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U. S. 488, 518-520 [7 Sup. Ct. 985, 
30 L. Ed. 1039] ; Leavenworth Lawrence & Galv.eston R. R. 
00. v. United States, 92 U. S. 733 [23 L. Ed. 634] ; St. Louis 
Smelting & Ref. 00. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636, 641 [26 L. Ed. 
875] ; Davis v. Wiebbold, 139 U. S. 507, 518, 519 [11 Sup. 
Ct. 628, 35 L. Ed. 238].) This principle is further sup-
ported by the California cases (Van Ness v. Rooney, 160 Cal. 
131 [116 Pac. 392]; Ohicago Quartz M. 00. v. Oliver, 75 
Cal. 194 [16 Pac. 780, 7 Am. St. Rep. 143] ; Brown v. L1tddy. 
121 Cal. App. 494 [9 Pac. (2d) 326]) and by cases in other 
jurisdictions (Butte Oity Smokeh01tse Lode Oases, 6 Mont. 
397, 401 [12 Pac. 858]; Silver Bow M. & M. 00. v. Clark, 
5 Mont. 378, 415 [5 Pac. 570] ; Talbott v. King, 6 Mont. 76 
[9 Pac. 434] ; I(ansas Oity etc. 00. v. Clay, 3 Ariz. 326 [29 
Pac. 9]; Loney v. Scott, 57 Or. 378 [112 Pac. 172, 173, 32 
L. R. A. (N. S.) 466]). 
The patent secured by the railroad in 1880 was issued 
under the authority of the Railroad Grant' Act of July 25, 
1866, and could in no way apply to mineral land title to 
which had been previously vested in others. Any authority 
it might acquire in the passage of time as to the nature of 
the land, despite the limitations of the act, could operate 
only against subsequently located claims. (Van Ness v. 
Rooney, supmj Brown v. Luddy, supra.) Thus, the patent 
which determined that the Ames Tract was agricultural ap-
plied only to the surface of the land and to that portion of 
the subsurface not already subject to existing extralateral 
rights. (Lindley, Mines [3d ed.], sec. 613, p. 1462.) What-
ever claims plaintiffs advance to the subsurface mineral land 
of the Ames Tract would have to date from the issuance of 
the patent and not from the date of the Railroad Grant Act, 
and by the time of the issuance of the patent the extralateral 
rights of the Pennsylvania and Jefferson mines in the Ames 
'fract had already fully vested by virtue of the Mining Act 
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of July 26, 1866. [7] There can be no objection to havmg 
the title to the surface in one person and the title to the sub-
surface in another, a practice recognized at common law 
and widely followed today. (Lindley, Mines [3d ed.], sec. 
812.) 
[8] For the same reasons the state did not, as plaintiffs con-
tend, acquire a fee simple to both the surface and subsurface 
of the strip of school land intervening between the Ames 
Tract and the mining properties cutting off any extralateral 
rights the latter might claim in the former. When the act 
of March 3, 1853 (10 Stats. at Large 244), made a grant 
of certain sections of each township to the state for school 
purposes, it expressly excepted all mineral lands. The land 
in question was still unsurveyed and the sections of land 
to be granted therefore still undetermined. Following the 
survey in 1867, no title could pass from the United States 
to 'the state to land determined to be mineral. (West v. 
Standard O~l Co., 278 U. S. 200 [49 Sup. Ct. 138, 73 L. Ed. 
265]; United States v. Sweet, supraj Barden v. Northern 
Pacific R. R. Co., supraj Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. San-
ders, supraj Ivanhoe M. Co. v. Keystone Consolo M. Co., 102 
U. S. 167, 175 [26 L. Ed. 126].) The mineral subsurface :~ 
then subject to the vested extralateral rights of the adjoin- .. 
ing mines, could therefore not pass to the state under the 
terms of the grant. 
Even if, as plaintiffs contend, the certification by the Regis-
ter of the United States Land Office on March 7, 1871, that 
there was no claim or filing on this land other than that of 
the state had the effect of a patent establishing the complete 
title of the state, its determination could be effective only 
against subsequently located mining claims and not against 
existing vested extralateral rights therein. Saunders v. La 
Purisima etc. Co., 125 Cal. 159 [57 Pac. 656], cited by plain-
tiffs concerned not only a subsequent claim but one with 
respect to the surfilCe of the land. In contrast West v. Stand-
ard 'Oil Co., 278 U. S. 200 [49 Sup. Ct. 138, 73 L. Ed. 265], 
indicates that these certificates issued by the registrars of 
local land offices were unauthorized and of no binding effect. 
[9] Plaintiffs argue further that the Mining Act of 1872, 
by restricting future mining claims asserting extralateral 
rights to a maximum of 1500 feet along the vein, precludes the 
patent t.o the Pennsylvania mine, secured at a later date, from 
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encompassing extralateral rights based upon a greater length. 
l'he mining patent cannot thus be limited by that act, how-
ever, when issued in pursuance to the earlier act of JUly 
26, 1866, on the basis of an earlier location. (Lawson v. 
United States Min. Co., 207 U. S. 1 [28 Sup. Ct. 15, 52 L. Ed. 
65]; Carson City etc. Min. Co. v. North Star Min. Co., 73 
Fed. 597; affd. 83 Fed. 658 [28 C. C. A. 333]; Pennsyl-
vania Consolo Min. Co. v. Grass Valley etc. Co., 117 Fed. 
509.) The plaintiffs themselves declare that a patent prop-
erly issued and in conformance with the provisions of an 
Act of Congress relates the title back to the date of that act. 
[10] Furthermore, the additional length of the claim resulted 
from the consolidation of three original claims, the lines of 
which need not be shown to establish the validity of an exist-
ing patent to the consolidated claim on collateral attack. (St. 
L01lis Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636 [26 L. Ed. 
875]; Tucker v. Masser, 113 U. S. 203 [5 Sup. Ct. 420, 28 
L. Ed. 979]; Peabody Gold Min. Co. v. Gold Hill Min. Co., 
111 Fed. 817 [49 C. C. A. 637].) 
[11] Defendants can establish their extralateral rights in 
the Ames Tract as owners of the Jefferson mine as well as of 
the Pennsylvania mine. While the Jefferson mine was never 
patented and was subsequently abandoned and relocated so 
that it might be said to constitute a mining claim coming 
into existence after the issuance of the patent to the Central 
Pacific Railroad for the Ames Tract (Burke v. Southern 
Pacific R. R. Co., supra), the deed of the Ames land to the 
present plaintiffs from Ebert, their immediate predecessor 
in title, specifically reserved to Ebert, his successors and 
assigns, the right to follow the Jefferson vein beneath the 
Ames land and to mine therefrom. By mesne conveyances, 
defendants succeeded to the rights of Ebert under this reser-
vation, by virtue of which they clearly have the right to 
follow the vein of the Jefferson mine beneath the surface 
of the plaintiffs' land. 
[12] As for plaintiffs' contention that regular perform-
ance of annual labor is necessary to maintain a good title, 
it is well established that title to a mining claim does not 
terminate Upon a failure to perform annual labor. The in-
tervention of a third party and a relocation of the ground 
must OCcur before any forfeiture can take place. (Lindley, 
Mines [3d ed.], sec. 651; Wilbur v. Krushnic, 280 U. S. 306 
(50 Sup. Ct. 103, 74 L. Ed. 445] ; Belcher etc. O(). v. De/errari
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62 Cal. 160, 163; Emerson v. McWhirter, 133 Cal. 510 [65 
Pac. 1036].) Hence there are no grounds for attacking the 
validity of the Pennsylvania claim on this basis. [13] The 
plaintiffs are precluded from taking advantage of any for-
feiture and subsequent relocation of the Jefferson claim be-
cause of the reservation of mining rights in their deed to the 
Ames Tract from Ebert. 
It remains to consider plaintiffs' contention that the de-
fendants have failed to prove the original location of the 
mining claims, their continued existence, compliance with the 
miners' rules and regulations, or what these rules and regu-
lations were. The trial court found that the defendants' 
evidence established all these things; the question here turns 
on whether such evidence is hearsay as plaintiffs contend. 
Defendants introduced properly authenticated copies of deeds 
and other instruments now of record in the County Record-
er's Office in Yuba County, patent records on file in the 
official records in the General Land Office in Washington, 
D. C., printed official reports of the "Mineral Resources" of 
the Public Domain of the West, published under authority 
of Congress, and other historical material. This evidence 
was supplemented by the oral testimony of two old settlers 
that both the Pennsylvania and the Jefferson mines were in 
operation on the present location in the early 1860 'so The 
case of Kent v. Snyder et al. (1866), 30 Cal. 666, which 
mentions in its statement of facts the location of the Jeffer-
son claim by its original owners corroborates the existence 
of this claim prior to 1866. 
[14] It is a well established exception to the hearsay rule 
that evidence of common reputation existing previous to the 
controversy may be introduced to prove the existence of 
boundaries and facts of a public or general interest more than 
thirty years old. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1870.) The original 
location of a mine, particularly on government land, is within 
the scope of this exception (Muller v. Southern Pacific Branch 
Ry. 00., 83 Cal. 240 [23 Pac. 265]; Simons v. Inyo Oerro 
Gordo etc. 00.,48 Cal. App. 524 [192 Pac. 144]). Recitals in 
ancient deeds (Wilson v. Snow, 228 U. S. 217 [33 Sup. Ct. 
487,57 L. Ed. 807] ; Garbarino v. Noce, 181 Cal. 125 [183 Pac. 
532, 6 A. L. R. 1433]), and statements in official documents 
kept as part of the regular function of the office by some 
department of the government or authorized by the legisla-
ture are likewise recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
:! 
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(Code Civ. Proc., secs. 1920, 1924; Ohesapeake & Delaware 
Oanal 00. v. Unit·ed States, 250 U. S. 123 [39 Sup. Ct. 407, 63 
L. Ed. 889].) 
[15] The evidence introduced by the defendants is admis-
sible to prove the proper location and existence of the mining 
claims under these ex'ceptions to the hearsay rule. The pat-
ent records containing abstracts of title to the mining claims, 
recitals as to the location of these claims in several ancient 
deeds, verified statements as to the location and possession 
of the mines, a copy of the articles of incorporation of the 
early Pennsylvania Mining Corporation, a certified COpy of 
the minutes of meetings of the Quartz Miners of Brown's 
Valley, descriptions of the claims by metes and bounds, the 
Register's final certificate of entry of the patent, and the 
field notes of survey and report of the United States Deputy 
Mineral Surveyor on the Pennsylvania mine are clearly rec-
ords kept in the usual course of business by the General Land 
Office and thus admissible as official documents. (Oulver v. 
Uthe, 133 U. S. 655 [10 Sup. Ct. 415, 33 L. E'd. 776] ; Galt v. 
Galloway, 29 U. S. 332 [7 L. Ed. 876] ; People v. Hagar, 52 
Cal. 171.) [16] So, too, the official report of the Mineral Re-
sources of the Public Domain of the West being published 
under the direct authority of Congress as an official report 
to the Secretary of the Treasury falls into the category of 
an official document, the contents of which are admissible to 
show the location and working of the mines in pursuance 
to the miners' rules and regulations then in existence. [17] 
In addition, since these locations may be proven by evidence 
of general reputation previous to the controversy there is 
no reason why the defendants cannot introduce the History 
of Yuba County by Chamberlain and Wells (1879) for such 
a purpose. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1936.) Thus, the finding 
by the trial court that a valid location was made is a legiti-
mate finding of fact supported by admissible evidence. (Al-
toona Q. M. 00. v. Integral Q. M. 00., 114 Cal. 100 [45 Pac. 
1047] ; Gruwell v. Rocca, 141 Cal. 417 [74 Pac. 1028] j Har-
ris v. Kellogg, 117 Cal. 484 [49 Pac. 708]; Oolman v. me-
ments, 23 Cal. 245 j Adams v. Orawford, 116 Cal. 495 [48 
Pac. 488].) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Ward, J., pro tem., Peters, J., 
pro tem., and Gibson~ C. J., concurred. 
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CARTER, J., Dissenting.-I dissent. 
The majority opinion in this case is so lacking in logical 
reasoning and unsupported by authority that it can truth-
fully be said that it is basically unsound. 
While my past experience as a practical miner and natural 
leaning toward the mining industry should cause me to favor 
the conclusion reached in the majority opinion, I am pur-
suaded by considerations of both reason and authority that 
such conclusion is contrary to settled principles of law, sound 
reasoning, and every consideration of equity and natural jus-
tice. The conclusion reached in the majority opinion not only 
renders insecure and subject to collateral attack every rail-
road patent in this state, but it places the same cloud upon 
every agricultural patent which has been issued within the 
last seventy-five years. 
The gist of the majority opinion in this case is that the 
railroad company by its patent obtained title to the surface 
of the Ames Tract only, and that the predecessors in interest 
of the mining company obtained title to the subsurface of said 
tract. In my opinion this view is palpably erroneous for the . 
reason that it is the settled rule, and the authorities are uni- .~ 
form in holding, that a patent to a railroad company issued 
pursuant to the so-called Railroad Grant Acts conveys thereby 
a common law fee in nonmineral land. (Lawson v. U. S. 
Mining Company, 207 u. S. 1 [28 Sup. Ct. 15, 52 L.Ed. 
65] ; A:mador Medean Gold Mining Co. v. South Spring Hill 
Gold Mining Co., 36 Fed. 668 [13 Sawy. 523].) 
Section 829 of our Civil Code provides: "The owner of land 
in fee has the right to the surface and to everything per-
manently situated beneath or above it." 
No attempt is made in the majority opinion to define the 
limits of the so-called surface and subsurface ownerships. 
Nothing is said therein to indicate whether or not it is meant 
that the owner of the surface may penetrate into the sub-
surface to any extent, or if so, to what extent; in other 
words, under this announced new doctrine, may the owner of 
the surface dig a post hole, a cellar, or sink a well? If he 
may do these things, how much further may he go' 
The effect of the holding of the majority opinion is to grant 
to the owner of the Pennsylvania and Jefferson claims all of 
the mineral deposits which may be under the surface ~f the 
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Ames Tract whether or not the same constitute the extra-
lateral dip of veins apexing on said claims; in other words, 
by holding that the railroad company got no title to the 
mineral deposited in the Ames Tract because by its patent it 
simply got title to the surface of said tract, and that the 
predecessor in interest of the defendant got title to the sub-
surface of said tract, the plaintiffs in this action are deprived 
of the right to extract mineral deposits from said tract even 
though they have no connection or relation to the veins apex-
ing on the Pennsylvania and Jefferson claims. 
The majority opinion grants to the defendant much broader 
rights than those claimed by the defendant itself, as the right 
claimed by the defendant in this case is based exclusively upon 
the extralateral right doctrine and not otherwise. 
The rights flowing from the extralateral right doctrine have 
many restrictions and limitations and certainly do not include 
the entire subsurface of the land into which veins may dip. 
First, some of those limitations are expressed in the law estab-
lishing and confirming such rights. In 30 U. S. C. A. 26, it 
is provided in part: "The locators ... shall have the exclu-
sive right of possession . . . of all the surface included within 
the lines of their location, and of all veins, lodes, and ledges 
throughout their entire depth, the top or apex of which lies 
inside of such surface lines extended downward vertically, 
although such veins, lodes or ledges may so depart from a 
perpendicular in their course downward as to extend outside 
the vertical side lines of such surface locations. But their 
right of possession to ·such outside parts of such veins or 
ledges shall be confined to wch portions thereof as lie be-
tween vertical planes drawn downward as above described, 
through the end lines of their locations, so continued in their 
own direction that such planes will intersect such exterior 
parts of suc4 veins or ledges. Nothing in this section shall 
authorize the locator or possessor of a vein or lode which 
extends in its downward course beyond the vertical lines of 
his claim to enter upon the surface of a claim owned or pos-
sessed by another." 
Second, it is elementary that to have extralateral rights in 
a vein, the apex thereof must be on the location. (Costigan 
Mining Law, p. 409 e1; seq.; 30 U. S. C. A. 26.) 
Third, the identity and continuity of the vein must be estab-
lished and it must have an apex and a dip. As stated in 
Costigan on Mining Law, page 410: 
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"The identity and substantial continuity of the vein from 
its apex down is essential to the existence of extralateral rights 
on the vein, and there are no extralateral rights unless the 
vein has an apex and a dip." And in this connection the 
presumption is that no dip exists. (Costigan on Mining Law, 
p. 411; Lindley on Mines [3d ed.1, sec. 615.) 
Fourth, extralateral rights do not extend to secondary veins 
which croSS the principal vein at right angles. (Costigan 
on Mining Law, p. 440.) 
To say that the subsurface rights were acquired by the 
mining patentees is manifestly unsound. The most that they 
can claim are the extralateral rights and certainly such rights 
do not embrace all of the subsurface rights nor all of the 
right to all of the mineral under the surface of the Ames 
Tract. This is forcefully illustrated by the rule that extra-
lateral rights only extend along the dip of the vein, that is, 
continue only as long as the vein runs downward in its lateral 
extension. If it at any time runs parallel or upward then 
the extralateral rights cease. It is said in 40 C. J. 819: 
"An extralateral right applies to the vein only on its down-
ward course or dip, outside the side lines, and does not au-
thorize a locator to follow the vein on its course or strike 
outside the boundaries of the claim, as where it becomes flat- :! 
tened and extends from thence horizontally in a departure 
from the general plane of the vein, or for any considerable 
distance takes an upward trend." 
In Tom Reed Gold MirlJes 00. v. United Eastern Mining 00., 
24 Ariz. 269 [209 Pac. 283, 2871, it is said: 
"The authorities construing this section hold (1) that the 
vein to which this extralateral right is claimed must be fol-
lowed on its 'course downward' and. (2) that the right attaches 
only to the identical vein which has its apex within the loca-
tion, and not to another and different vein lying outside the 
vertical boundaries of the claim. Both these conditions must 
. exist, and are independently essential to the right of extra-
lateral possession and enjoyment. We treat of them in order: 
"(1) The vein must be pursued on its course downward. 
"In Stewart M. 00. v. Ontario M. 00., 23 Idaho, 724, 132 
Pac. 787, it was said: 
" 'Sometimes it may happen that the' downward course' 
of a vein will be perpendicular, and the vein will form a 
vertical plane, but, as a rule, there is a deflection in the 
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downward course of these mineral veins from the perpendicu-
lar, and we call this their dip; but still the course of the dip 
is always' downward,' and, when the plane of the vein reaches 
the horizontal, then we have a blanket vein or lode, and on 
such a vein a locator has no extralateral right . ... The Su-
preme Court always qualifies its holdings in this respect by 
the condition of the statute that the course between those 
vertical planes must be downward.' 
"In Southern Nevada G. db S. M. Co. v. Holmes M. Co., 
27 Nev. 103, 73 Pac. 759, 103 Am. St. Rep. 759, it was held: 
" 'If the defendant entered upon a ledge having its apex 
within the exterior boundaries of plaintiff's location, and ex-
tracted ore therefrom between the planes drawn vertically 
downward through the end lines of said location, the right 
of the plaintiff to recover damages for such acts would not 
be affected by proof merely that the place from which such ore 
was extracted could be reached by going continuously through 
ledge matter from a ledge having its apex within the exterior 
boundaries of a prior location belonging to the defendant, 
but it must further appear that such passage from the apex 
of defendant's ledge is made continuously downward on the 
dip of that ledge, and if any portion of such passage must 
necessarily be made either upward, or laterally along the 
strike, then the plaintiff's right to recover is not affected.' 
"See Lindley on Mines (3d ed.) sections 319 and 589, and 
St. Louis M. Co. v. Montana M. Co., 113 Fed. 900, 51 C. C. A. 
530, 64 L. R. A. 207; Id., 194 U. S. 235, 24 Sup. Ct. 654, 48 
L. Ed. 953. 
"While the authorities which have passed upon the question 
are but few in number, there would seem to be no reason to 
doubt that the excerpts we have quoted state the true rule, 
which is that no extralateral right exists to a vein, lode, or 
ledge beyond the point where in its course outside the claim 
of apex it becomes flattened and extends from thence hori-
zontally in a departure from the approximate general plane 
of the vein in its downward course, or for any considerable 
distance takes an upward trend." 
Sixth, the holder of such rights has no general exploratory 
rights under another'~ land, and he cannot tunnel through 
the other's land to reach his vein, or as it is said in St. Louis 
Min. & M~7,l. CQ. v. Montana Min. Co., 113 Fed. 900 [5) 
.. 
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C. C. A. 530, 64 L. R. A. 207] (affirmed: 194 U. S. 235 [24 
Sup. Ct. 654, 48 L. Ed. 953]), at page 902: 
"They are given the right of possession of the surface and 
of everything within their own claim except the veins or lodes 
therein, which may have their apices in the surface of another 
claim, so as to give the owner of the latter extralateral rights, 
and they are given the right to follow outside of their side 
lines and into adjoining claims all veins or lodes which have 
their apices in their own claims, so as to confer extralateral 
rights. This is their right, and no mo'l'e. There is no war-
rant for saying that they have any general right of explora-
ticm within land of an adjoining patented claim, whether upon 
or below the surface. The right of exploration is given for the 
purpose of making discovery of mineral. Of what avail would 
be the right of exploration if no benefit could be obtained 
from discovery made thereby 1 The ground covered by a 
subsisting, valid mineral location is open to exploration only 
by the owner thereof. The statute gives the appeJlants the 
right to follow the vein which they were seeking to reach by 
the tunnel, but it confers upon them no right to approach 
it from any point other than from the vein or lode itself." 
It is a matter of common knowledge among persons familiar 
with mineral deposits, and I know from my own experience, 
that two or more distinct mineral deposits may exist in such 
close proximity that they may be covered by a single mineral 
location; hence, it is possible that there are mineral veins 
underlying the surface of the Ames Tract which mayor may 
not be subject to the extralateral right of mining claims lo-
cated on adjacent land. By holding that the railroad com-
pany got title to the surface of the Ames Tract only, the plain-
tiffs would be barred from extracting the mineral from said 
deposits under the rule announced in the majority opinion. 
This doctrine of surface and subsurface ownerships finds no 
support in the decided cases in this or any other country 
w4ere the common law. prevails. The only authority for it 
cited in the majority opinion is Lindley on Mines, Third Edi-
tion, section 812. While the language used by this author in 
connection with this particular subject matter is very vague, 
he frankly states that it is a "radical doctrine". 
I feel then that I am justified in saying that the majority 
opinion stands alone in the enunciation of this unsound and 
unsupported doctrine. In this respect it may be said that 
-!r 
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said opinion is a hybrid, and like the quadruped noted for 
its stubbornness, it is "without pride of ancestry or hope of posterity". 
The specific question which we are called upon to determine 
in this case is whether the defendant has the right to follow a 
vein of gold bearing quartz apexing on its mining claim which 
dips extralaterally from defendant's mining claim into plain-
tiffs' land, the eastern boundary of which is parallel with, 
but 200 feet west of the western boundary of said mining 
claim, where plaintiffs' title originated by virtue of the Rail-
road Grant Act of JUly 25, 1866, was confirmed by a patent 
issued to the Central Pacific Railway Company on June 14, 
1880, and by mesne conveyances vested in plaintiffs. 
No claim is made by defendant that either the railroad 
company or any of the government officials had any knowl-
edge whatever that the Ames land contained a mineral deposit 
or that it Was other than nonmineral land at the time the 
patent was issued. Said land was duly classified as non-
mineral by the United States Land Office, and a patent there-
for was duly and regularly issued pursuant to said Railroad 
Grant Act. The railroad company thereafter conveyed a 
fee title to said land to the predecessor in interest of plain-
tiffs, and this title was ultimately conveyed to plaintiffs. 
The United States Supreme Court has uniformly held that 
there must be a time at which title to land must be settled, 
and has determined that said time shall be at the date of 
issuance of patent. 
Since mineral lands are excluded from the grants in aid 
of railroads, before patent can issue to railroad lands, there 
must be a determination as to whether or not the land is 
mineral or nonmineral in character, that is, whether it is 
more valuable for mining or agricultural purposes. 
The duty of making such a decision devolves upon the Gen-
eral Land Office, whose decision is in the nature of a quasi-
judicial determination, and conclusive thereafter as against 
collateral attack. 
As the majority opinion does not contain either a complete 
or correct statement of the facts of this case, I will make a 
statement of the essen~ial facts before proceeding with a dis-
cussion of the legal principles applicable thereto. 
This is an appeal from a judgment for defendant in an ac-
tion in ejectment. Although plaintiffs asked for an injunc-
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tion and accounting in the same action, it was agreed by 
stipulation of the parties that trial of the issue of damages 
should be held in abeyance until the question of title had been 
determined on appeal. Therefore, that question only is now 
before this court. 
The action arose out of a dispute over the title to a vein 
of gold bearing quartz which extends extralaterally under the 
land of the plaintiffs from an apex on mining claims in the 
possession of the defendant. 
Defendant admittedly has been extracting the ore from 
said vein, and maintains its right to do so by virtue of its 
ownership of the apex of said vein within said mining claims. 
The land belonging to the plaintiffs hereinafter called" the 
Ames tract", is described by legal subdivision as the S. W. 14 
of section 15, T. 16 N. R. 5 E., M. D. B. & M., situated in 
Yuba County, California. The inception of the Ames title is 
an Act of Congress, effective July 25, 1866 (14 U. S. Stat. 
A. L. 239), granting to the California and Oregon Railway 
Company certain lands "to aid in the construction of a rail-
road". Mineral lands were excepted from this grant. Upon 
completion of the railroad, a map showing its location was 
filed in the United States Land Office, July 27, 1870. There- ..:.! 
after, the Central Pacific Railroad Company succeeded to the 
rights of the California and Oregon Railway Company and 
received a United States patent for lands, including the Ames 
land, on June 14, 1880. Plaintiffs acquired title to the Ames 
Tract through a deed from J. E. Ebert, who had succeeded to 
the railroad title. 
The defendant's land is located in the S. E. 14 of section 16, 
T. 16 N. R. 5 E., M. D. B. & M., which adjoins said section 
15 on the west. It consists of two quartz mining claims, known 
as the Pennsylvania and Jefferson claims, which defendant 
holds under lease and option from the owners. These claims 
and the Ames Tract are not adjacent, for a strip of school 
land two hundred feet in width lies between them. The 
claims, both four hundred feet in width, are located contigu-
ously on a north and south vein of gold bearing quartz, and 
have side lines substantially parallel with the section line 
between said sections 15 and 16. The Jefferson claim ex-
tends seven hundred fifty feet north from the south line of 
section 16. The Pennsylvania claim joins the Jefferson claim 
at its north boundary and continues northward for a distance 
-----.-
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of one thousand five hundred forty feet. The vein which ex. 
tends throughout the length of these two claims dips extra. 
laterally under the narrow strip of school land and continues 
into the Ames property. 
The Act of Congress under which defendant asserts its title 
to the Pennsylvania and Jefferson claims authorized the dis-
posal of mineral lands from the public domain and became 
effective July 26, 1866 (14 U. S. Stat. A. L. 251). Comply-
ing with the provisions of this statute, one of defendant's 
predecessors secured a patent to the Pennsylvania mining 
claim. The first application for said patent was made in 
January, 1874, but because of adverse proceedings and a 
technical defect, this application was denied with leave to 
renew. The renewal was made January 22, 1880. There-
after, on May 31, 1880, the local land office receiver at 
Marysville issued his receipt for money paid by applicant, and 
the register of said office issued his final certificate of entry. 
Patent to the Pennsylvania claim was issued by the United 
States Government on August 18, 1880, to the Pennsylvania 
Mining Company, which company was incorporated in 1863. 
The Jefferson claim is unpatented but held by location. 
Although the earliest recorded location of this, claim appar-
ently was made in 1891, defendant claims its predecessors have 
worked both the Pennsylvania and Jefferson claims since the 
early days of California. 
The strip of school land which separates the mining claims 
from the Ames Tract was granted to the State of California 
under the Act of Congress dated March 3, 1853 (10 U. S. 
Stat. A. L. 244), which granted the 16th and 36th sections 
of each township for school purposes. The grant of these 
sections also was subject to the reservation of mineral lands. 
The lands were then unsurveyed, the survey of them being 
completed August 6, 1867. On May 22, 1882, the eastern 
one-half of the S. E. quarter of section 16, in which were 
located the two mining claims, was conveyed by patents of 
the State of California to certain grantees, I. S. Belcher and 
W. C. Belcher, who later conveyed their titles under the state 
patents to the Pennsylvania Mining Company, a predecessor 
of the defendant. 
In its statement of ,facts the majority opinion says: "On 
June 14, 1880, the Central Pacific Railroad, pursuant to its 
legislative grant, secured a patent to the Ames tract, which 
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transformed it from a 'float' to an established title by the 
definite location of the railroad line." Again l,ater the state-
ment is made that "In the present case there was no final 
and definite location of the Ames tract by the railroad until 
the securing of the patent in 1880"; and further that "The 
patent which definitely located and established the railroad's 
claim stated that the Ames tract was agricultural land. " The 
first of these statements is to say the least ambiguous and the 
other two indicate a complete lack of understanding as to 
the time of the vesting of title to railroad land. 
The securing of a patent has nothing to do with the actual 
vesting of title to railroad land. It is merely a confirmation 
of a title which has already vested. It is too well settled to 
admit of argument that grants in aid of railroads are grants 
made in praesenti, and that where the line of such roads is not 
located the grant remains a float, but that when the route 
of the road is definitely fixed, the sections granted become 
susceptible of identification, and the title attaches to them 
and took effect as of the date of the grant cutting off all in-
tervening claims. (Wisconsin Oentral Railroad 00. v. Price 
00., 133 U. S. 496, 509 [10 Sup. Ct. 341, 33 L. Ed. 687]; 
Deseret Salt 00. v. Tarpey, 142 U. S. 241 [12 Sup. Ct. 158, 
35 L. Ed. 999] ; Jatunn v. Smith, 95 Cal. 154 [30 Pac. 200].) -! 
Confirmation of this title by patent also relates back to the 
date of the original grant, thereby cutting off all intervening 
rights. 
The majority opinion states as a contention of the plain-
tiffs "that the full title to the Ames tract was conveyed away 
prior to the passage of the Mining Act of July 26, 1866, so 
that the latter could in no way confer upon the adjoining 
mines extralateral rights in the Ames tract." Then con-
tinues with "This argument might seem persuasive except 
'for one vital factor. The Railroad Grant Act of July 25, 
1866, upon which the plaintiffs rely for their original title, 
specifically excepted from its operation all mineral lands. 
The terms of the Act make it clear that Congress did not 
intend to vest in the railroad title to any mineral lands of 
the United States (Barden v. No. Pacific R. R. 00., 154 
'U. S. 288 [14 Sup. Ct. 1030, 38 L. Ed. 992] ; United States 
v. Sweet, 245 U. S. 563 [38 Sup. Ct. 193, 62 L. Ed. 473]; 
Broder v. Natona Water db M. 00., 101 U. S. 274 [25 L. Ed. 
790] ; No. Pacific R. R. 00. v. Sanders, 166 U. S. 620 [17 Sup. 
,Ct. 671, 41 L. Ed. 1139] ; McOlintock v. Bryden et al., 5 Cal. 
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97 [63 Am. Dec. 87J)." This much of the opinion's state-
ment is true-that the Railroad Grant Act excepted mineral 
lands, and that Congress did not intend thereby to vest in 
the railroad title to any mineral lands in the United States. 
But the next statement in the opinion is completely false 
and unsupported by the cases cited in its favor,-namely, that 
"The subsurface of the Ames Tract being clearly mineral 
could not pass under the terms of the Act but remained in 
the Government, and the Pennsylvania and Jefferson mines 
received full extralateral rights to mine therein by virtue of 
the Mining Act of July 26, 1866. 
In the Barden case, supra, the Northern Pacific R. R. Com-
pany claimed title to lands admittedly mineral in character 
not by virtue of a patent thereto, but on the ground that 
the lands were not known to be mineral until after the filing 
of its map showing the location of its road, and that there-
fore they passed to the railroad company at said time. The 
court held, and correctly so, that the time for final determi-
nation of the character of the land was not the date of the 
filing of the map of definite location, but the date of the 
issuance of patent thereto. In the present case, however, the 
railroad company secured a patent to the land in question. 
The Barden case, supra, stating that the plaintiffs therein 
had no cause for apprehending that its decision would lead 
to uncertainty of titles, proceeded to discuss the results which 
would obtain if a patent were issued: 
"We do not think that any apprehension of disturbance in 
titles from the views we assert need arise. The law places 
under the supervision of the Interior Department and its 
subordinate officers, acting under its direction, the control of 
all matters affecting the disposition of public lands of the 
United States, and the adjustment of private claims to them 
under the legislation of Congress. It can hear contestants 
and decide upon the respective merits of their claims. It can 
investigate and settle the contentions of all persons with re-
spect to such claims. It can hear evidence upon and deter-
mine the character of lands to which different parties assert 
a right; and when the controversy before it is fully considered 
and ended, it can iss1,le to the rightful claimant the patent 
provided by law, specifying that the lands are of the char-
acter for which a patent is authorized. It can thus determine 
whether the lands called for are swamp lands, timber lands, 
agricultural lands, or mineral lands, and so designate them in 
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the patent which it issues. The Act of Congress making the 
grant to the plaintiff provides for the issue of a patent to 
the grantee for the land claimed, and as the grant excludes 
mineral lands in the direction for such patent to issue, the 
Land Office can examine into the character of the lands, and 
designate it in its conveyance. 
"It is the established doctrine, expressed in numerous deci-
sions of this court, that wherever Oongress has provided for 
the disposition of any portion of the public lands, of a par-
ticular character, and authorizes the officers of the Land De-
partment to issue a patent for such land upon ascertainment 
of certain facts, that department has jurisdiction to inquire 
into and determine as to the existence of such facts, and in 
the absence of fraud, imposition, or mistake, its determina-
tion is conclusive against collateral attack." (Italics added.) 
The cases cited in the majority opinion as authority for 
the statement that "by the terms of the Act it is clear Con-
gress did not intend to vest in the railroad title to any mineral 
lands of the United States", support this statement with 
which I am in full accord. However, none of them is au-
thority for the statement which follows to the effect that the 
subsurface of the Ames Tract being clearly mineral could not . 
pass under the terms of the act and remained in the govern- ~ 
ment. 
The case of United States v. Sweet, supra, involved a ques-
tion as to whether 40 acres of land known to be valuable 
for coal before Utah became a state, passed to the state by 
a school land grant which neither expressly included nor 
excluded mineral lands. The court held that the grant was 
to be read in the light of the mining laws, the school land in-
demnity law providing for lieu selections where sections 16 
and 36 were mineral, and the settled policy of Congress re-
specting mineral lands, and concluded that the sections known 
to be mineral when the grant took effect did not pass under 
the grant. 
In the case of Broder v. Natona Water 00., supra, defend-
ant's right to maintain a canal over the lands of the plaintiff 
was upheld although it was constructed over lands subse-
quently granted to a railroad company, by reason of the 
fact that Congress had previous to the Railroad Grant Act 
enacted a statute conferring on owners of such canals a pre-
existing right. It does not appear, however, from a reading 
Jan. 194i.] AMES V. EMPffiE STAR MINES Co., LTD. 237 
of the case that the railroad company's lands were ever 
patented to it. 
The case of No. Pacific R. R. 00. v. Sanders, supra, does 
not involve a case in which the railroad company ever ob-
tained a patent to the lands in controversy. The question 
decided therein was merely that where, at the time of the 
definite location of plaintiff's road, applications of record were 
pending to purchase said lands, said applications were 
"claims" within the meaning of the granting act, which ex-
cluded therefrom lands "not free from preemption or other 
claims or rights at the time the line of said road is definitely 
fiXed." 
McClintock v. Bryden et al., Supra, is an early decision of 
this court holding that where a person settles on any of the 
mining lands of this state, he settles on there subject to the 
rights of miners, who may proceed in good faith to extract 
valuable minerals therefrom in the most practicable manner 
in which they can be extracted, with least injury to the oc. 
cupying claimant, according to the express statutes of this 
state, even though the agricultural settler settled on the lands 
prior to said statute. 
As can be readily seen none of these cases has any direct 
bearing on the case at bar. They are authority for the gen-
eral propositions that mineral lands were excluded from a 
granting act and do not pass thereby to the grantee, but 
they in nowise militate against the decision in the Barden 
case, supra, that, when C\ determination has been made by the 
General Land Office that lands to whicli application for patent 
hq,s been made are nonmineral in character, and has isstted 
a patent pursuant to said decis1:on, that said determination is 
conclusive, and that regardless of the fact that the lands may 
thereafter appear to contain mineral in paying quantities. a 
common law fee conveying title to the center of the earth has 
passed to the patentees. (Italics added.) 
The majority opinion cites and relies upon the cases of 
Van Ness v. Rooney, 160 Cal. 131 [116 Pac. 392], Brown v. 
L1tddy, 121 Cal. App. 494 [9 Pac. (2d) 326], and Ohicago 
Quartz Mining 00. v. Oliver, 75 Cal. 194 [16 Pac. 780, 7 Am. 
St. Rep. 143], as authority for its statement that" It is well 
established that the government cannot convey away land 
which it no longer owns and that a patent cannot cut off 
previously existing vested rights in the patented property." 
In this connection said opinion further states: "The patent 
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secured by the railroad in 1880 ,was issued under the author-
ity of the Railroad Grant Act of July 25, 1866, and could in 
no way apply to mineral land,title to which had been previ-
ously vested in others. Any authority it might acquire in the 
passage of time as to the nature of the land, despite the limi-
tations of the Act, could operate only against subsequently 
located claims. (Van Ness v. Rooney, supra; Brown v. 
Luddy, supra.)" 
It is worthy of note that the last cited cases have not been 
cited or referred to in the voluminous briefs, petitions, or 
printed or oral argument presented to this court by the emi-
nent counsel on either side of this case. These counsel, or 
at least some of them, are specialists in the field of mining law, 
and I feel justified in stating that if the principles of law 
announced in these cases had any relevancy or application 
to the legal problems involved in this case, or could possibly 
form the basis for a legal theory upon which this case could 
be decided, those cases and the principles of law enunciated 
therein would certainly have been called to the attention of 
this court by such counsel. 
Aside from my own study and analysis of said cases, which 
has convinced me that they have no application to the legal . 
problems involved in the case at bar, the failure of eminent .~ 
counsel for defendant to cite or rely upon them as a basis for 
the determination of this case, convinces me beyond the possi-
bility of a doubt that said cases cannot be relied upon in sup-
port of the conclusion reached in the majority opinion in this 
case. 
I have long been familiar with the case of Van Ness v. 
Rooney, supra. It arose in the county where I was born and 
raised and was the subject of much discussion there for many 
years; in fact, I called the same to the attention of the author 
of the majority opinion. The decision of this case, both by 
the trial court and this court, was predicated upon the propo-
sition that a patent for land included in a railroad grant 
which expressly excludes and excepts from the lands de-
scribed in the granting clause" all mineral lands, should any 
such be found in the tracts aforesaid", does not pass title 
to a mineral claim included therein w~ich had been duly and 
legally located prior to the issuance of the patent. Obvi-
ously, such is not the problem involved in the case at bar. 
Furthermore, the case of Van Ness v. Rooney, supra, was 
decided by this court prior to the decision by the Supreme 
E 
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Court of the United States of the case of Burke v. So. Pa-
cific R. R. 00., 234 U. S. 669 [34 Sup. Ct. 907, 58 L. Ed. 
1527J, which held that an exception inserted in patents is-
sued under the Railroad Grant Act to the effect that if any 
of the lands described should be found to be mineral the 
same should be excluded from the operation of the patent is 
unauthorized and void, because the granting act contemplated 
that the patents should effectually and unconditionally pass 
the title to the land granted. In my opinion the decision of 
this court in the case of Van Ness v. Rooney, supra, is in di-
rect conflict with the decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in the case of Burke v. So. Pacific R. R. 00., 
supra, and the Van Ness case, supra, can no longer be con-
sidered an authority for the legal proposition decided therein. 
The case of Brown v. Luddy, supra, follows the decision of 
this court in the Van Ness case, supra, and the conclusion 
reached by the District Court of Appeal in the Brown case, 
supra, is predicated almost entirely if not wholly upon the 
theory advanced by this court in the Van Ness case, supra. 
The factual situation in the case of Brown v. Luddy, supra, 
was however, quite different than that in the Van Ness case, 
supra, and there is no similarity between the facts in either 
of those cases and the case at bar. In the Brown case, supra, 
the plaintiffs' mining claim was located and had been in 
existence and was being actually operated at the time of 
the passage of the statute authorizing the issuance of the 
stock-raising homestead patent which was the basis of de-
fendants' title in said case; said statute and the patent issued 
to Luddy expressly reserved to the United States "all coal 
and other minerals in the land". This is quite different than 
the provision in the patent issued to the railroad company in 
the Van Ness case, supra, which excepted" all mineral lands ". 
In my opinion the decision of the District Court of Appeal in 
the case of Brown v. Luddy, supra, announces principles of 
law much broader than was necessary to the decision of the 
legal propositions involved in said case, but in any event, 
it cannot be said to be authority supporting the position of 
the defendant here because the factual situation there was 
entirely different than that which obtains in the case at bar. 
The majority opinion also cites the case of Ohicago Quartz 
Mining 00. v. Oliver, 75 Cal. 194 [16 Pac. 780, 7 Am. St. 
Rep. 143], as announcing the same principle of law as that 
enunciated in the cases of Van Ness v. Rooney and Brown v . 
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Luddy, supra. The first mention of the Ohicago Quartz Min-
ing 00. case by any of the counsel in the case at bar was on 
October 9, 1940, when this case was argued for the second 
time before this court. It was then called to the court's 
attention by counsel for defendant in an outline of oral re-
argument. The Ohicago Quartz Mining 00. case holds that 
a patent issued by the United States Government to the 
Central Pacific R. R. 00. for land included within the bound-
aries of the grant made to it by the Act of Oongress of July 1, 
1862, is not conclusive evidence that the land covered by the 
patent is nonmineral in character, and a person claiming the 
land under a subsequent mining patent may show that the 
land is mineral, and therefore excepted from the operation 
of the grant to the railroad company. 
The decision in this case is in direct conflict with the now 
settled rule that the issuance of a patent to a railroad company 
under the Railroad Grant Act conclusively determines the 
nonmineral character of the land that the provision in such 
a patent excepting mineral land therefrom is void and the 
title conveyed to the railroad company by such patent is a 
title in fee to nonmineral land. (Burke v. So. Pacific R. R. 
00., $upra.) 
It appears from the opinion of this court in the Ohicago -l' 
Quartz Mining 00. case that the mining company there was 
claiming under patent to a mining claim issued approximately 
thirteen years subsequent to the patent issued to the railroad 
company, and there is no statement in the opinion of this court 
from which the conclusion can be drawn that the claim of the 
mining company to its mineral location antedated the patent 
to the railroad company. This case appears to have been 
decided upon the theory that the railroad company did not 
get title to the land embraced within its patent because the 
land involved in the action was valuable gold bearing mineral 
land, and known to be such at the time of the issuance of the 
railroad patent. As stated above, the decision of this court in 
the Ohicago Quartz Mining 00. case is in direct conflict with 
decisions of the Supreme Oourt of the United States and sub-
sequent decisions of this court. (See Paterson v. Ogden, 141 
Oal. 43 174 Pac. 443, 99 Am. St. Rep. 31] ; Jameson v. James, 
155 Oal. 275 [100 Pac. 700].) 
The majority opinion makes the statement that "When the 
Ames tract was finally and definitely located in 1880, its sub-
surface was not only known to be mineral but was subject 
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to the vested extralateral rights of the adjoining mines." I 
presume this statement must be interpreted to mean that, 
when the Ames Tract was patented, its subsurface was not 
only known to be mineral but was subject to the vested extra-
lateral rights of the adjoining miners. 
The majority opinion does not, however, state by whom the 
subsurface of the Ames Tract was !'known to be mineral". 
Defendant claims to have known that the Pennsylvania min-
eral vein underlay the Ames Tract at the time of its patenting. 
It does not appear, however, that such fact Was known to 
anyone else. There is no doubt that the act granting land to 
the railroad companies excluded mineral lands. However, the 
Supreme Oourt of the United States has held that a secure 
title to such lands must vest at some time and has set that 
time as the date of the issuance of patent. It is necessary 
therefore, at that time, said court has held, that land should 
be determined actually to be mineral or nonmineral. (Barden 
v. No. Pacific R. R. 00., supra; Shaw v. KeUogg, 170 U. S. 
312,337 [18 Sup. Ot. 632,42 L. Ed. 1050].) Since the duty 
of determining the character of land devolves upon the Gen-
eral Land Office, the Supreme Oourt of the United States 
has held that the persons to whom the land must be known 
to be mineral must be the officers of the Land Department in 
charge of the disposition of public lands. The court recog-
nized that said officers might often from the information 
available to them determine lands to be nonmineral which in 
fact contained mineral in quantities sufficient to render the 
land more valuable for mineral than agricultural purposes; 
nevertheless it has regarded the settling of the title to land 
at a definite date to be of such importance that if the land 
were not shown or known to be such by said officers at the 
time of patent their determination at said time as to the non-
mineral character of the land has, in the absence of fraud, been 
held thereafter to be conclusive. The Supreme Oourt of the 
United States expressed this view in Barden v. No. Pacific 
R. R. 00., supra, at page 329, as follows: 
"There are undoubtedly many cases arising before the 
Land Department in the disposition of the public lands where 
it will be a matter of much difficulty on the part of its of-
ficers to ascertain with accuracy whether the lands to be dis-
posed of are to be deemed mineral lands or agricultural lands, 
and in such cases the rule adopted that they will be considered 
mineral or agricultural as they are more valuable in the one 
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class or the other, may be sound. The officers will be gov-
erned by the knowledge of the lands obtained at the time as 
to their real character. The determination of the fact by 
those officers that they are one or the other will be considered 
as conclusive." That a patent is conclusive of the real char-
acter of the land even where issued without hearing and de-
termination on that point was settled in the Barden case, 
supra, where Mr. Justice Field said: 
"It is true that the patent has been issued in many in-
stances without the investigation and consideration which the 
public interest requires; but if that has been done without 
fraud, though unadvisedly by officers of the government 
charged with the duty of supervising and attending to the 
preparation and issue of such patents, the consequence must 
b~ borne by the government until by further legislation a 
stricter regard to their duties in that respect can be enforced 
upon them. The fact remains that under the law the duty of 
determining the character of the lands granted by Congress, 
and stating it in instruments transferring the title of the gov-
ernment to the grantees, reposes in officers of the Land De-
partment. " 
Likewise, in Burke v. So. Pacific R. R. Co., supra, at page 
709, the court said: 
"Taking up the several questions in the light of what we 
have said, we answer them as follows: 
"Did the said grant to the Southern Pacific Railroad Com-
pany include mineral lands which were known to be such at 
or prior to the date of the patent of JUly 10, 18941 
"Answer.-Minerallands, known to be such at or prior to 
the issue of patent, were not included in the grant but ex-
cluded from it, and the duty of determining the character of 
the lands was cast primarily on the Land Department, which 
was charged with the issue of patents. 
"Does a patent to a railroad company under a grant which 
~xcludes mineral lands, as in the present case, but which is 
issued without any investigation upon the part of the officers 
of the Land Office or of the Department of the Interior as to 
the quality of the land, whether agricultural or mineral, and 
without hearing upon or determination of the quality of the 
lands, operate to convey lands which· are thereafter ascer-
tained to be mineral Y 
.!! 
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"Answer.-A patent issued in such circumstances is irregu-
larly issued, undoubtedly so, but as it is the act of a legally 
constituted tribunal and is done within its jurisdiction, it is 
not void and therefore passes the title (Noble v. Union River 
Logging Railroad [Co.] 147 U. S. 165, 174-175 [37 L. Ed. 
123, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 271]), subject to the right of the Gov-
ernment to attack the patent by a direct suit for its annul-
ment if the land was known to be mineral when the patent 
issued. McLaughlin v. United States, 107 U. S. 526 [27 
L. Ed. 621, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 862] ; Western Pacific Railroad 
Co. v. United States, 108 U. S. 510 [27 L. Ed. 806, 2 Sup. 
Ct. Rep. 802]." (See also, West v. Standard Oil Co., 278 
U. S. 200, 211 [49 Sup. Ct. 138, 73 L. Ed. 265].) 
"Is the reservation and exception contained in the grant 
in the patent to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company void 
and of no effect Y 
"Answer.-The mineral land exception in the patent is 
void. 
"If the reservation of mineral lands as expressed in the 
patent is void, then is the patent, upon a collateral attack, a 
conclusive and official declaration that the land is agricultural 
and that all the requirements preliminary to the issuance 
of the patent have been complied with Y 
"Answer.-It is conclusive upon a collateral attack." 
Furthermore, lands must not only be "known" mineral 
lands, but must be known to be more valuable for mining 
than for agricultural purposes (Hunt v. Steese, 75 Cal. 620 
[17 Pac. 920]), and abandoned dry shafts on the land or the 
discovery of mineral in nonpaying quantities will not bring 
it within the "known" mineral classification. (Brown v. 
Luddy, supra.) 
The majority opinion states that "The Act, however, can-
not be the source of title to any mineral lands. As Justice 
Fields stated in Barden v. No. Pacific R. R. Co., supra, the 
Railroad Grant of July 25, 1866, when it excepted mineral 
lands meant that title to all mineral lands was to remain in 
the United States, and no rights to such lands could in any 
way pass to the railroad." 
But one conclusion can be drawn from the above-quoted 
statement attributed to Justice Field in the Barden case, and 
that is, that the writer of the majority opinion did not read 
the whole of said decision. The point which is made in the 
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Barden case and which the majority opinion seems completely 
to have ignored or overlooked is, and I solicit indulgence for 
repetition, that land known to contain mineral' in paying 
quantities may not be patented under said act to the rail-
roads, but that it is recognized that minerals are often not 
discovered at the time of the issuance of patent, or that the 
mineral content is not known at that time to be sufficient to 
classify the lands as being more valuable for mineral than 
for agricultural purposes; nevertheless, that title cannot be 
allowed to float around unsettled indefinitely ad infinitum; 
that the time of the issuance of patent is the best time to 
settle once and for all who shall have title to the land; that 
in view of the mineral land exception in the granting act, a 
determination as to the .character of land is necessary before 
patent thereto can issue; that said determination shall be 
conclusive in order to make the title conveyed by said patent 
settled and permanent regardless of the fact that minerals 
might later be discovered therein. 
The majority opinion criticizes the citation by plaintiffs of 
Burke v. So. Pacific R. R. 00., supra, West v. Standard Oil 
00., supra, and Davis v. Wiebbold, 139 U. S. 507 [11 Sup. Ct. 
628, 35 L. Ed. 238], as authority for the statement that a 
patent to railroad land is conclusive as to the agricultural 
character of the land, stating that these cases concern only 
the rights of a mining claimant coming into existence after 
the securing of the agricultural patent. 
It is true that in Davis v. Wiebbold, supra, the town-site 
patent under which defendant claimed the lands in contro-
versy antedated the discovery of minerals therein. The case 
of Burke v. So. Pacific R. R. 00., supra, however, did not 
involve a subsequent discovery of minerals. In said case cer-
tain lands were located as mineral claims in 1892. Subse-
quent thereto on May 9, 1892, the defendant railroad com-
pany with knowledge of said prior claims made application 
to have the same land patented to it under the Railroad 
Grant Act of July 27, 1866, and the Joint Resolution of 1870. 
The railroad company made a false affidavit, no notice of 
hearing was given, and a patent was issued on July 10, 1894. 
The original mineral claimants failed to perform their assess-
ment work for one year, whereupon the present claimants in 
March, 1909, relocated said land as placer mining claims. 
The court held that the government had never brought a 
! 
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bill in equity to have the patent vacated or annulled, that the 
time for so doing had expired, that there was no privity be-
tween the plaintiffs and the original mineral claimants, that 
the patent could not be successfully attacked by strangers 
who had no interest in the land at the time the patent was 
issued and were not prejudiced by it. It was further held 
that the patent though issued without investigation on the 
part of the land officers was conclusive though the land was 
afterward ascertained to be mineral. 
The case of West v. Standard Oil 00., supra, is authority 
for the proposition for which it was cited, but itself involves 
a ,different question. The Standard Oil Oompany claimed 
certain school lands under patent from the State of Oalifor-
nia. The Act of 1853, granting school lands to the states, 
made no provision for del ermining the character of such 
lands or for the exclusion from the grant of the land found 
to contain mineral; it did not provide for the issuance of 
patents; and no patent nor any evidence of title had been 
issued to the state. The Standard Oil Oompany contended 
that the nonmineral character of the land had been estab-
lished by a final determination in the department. The 
court held that no final determination as to the character of 
the land had been made by the department, that no patent 
had been issued which would imply that a determination as 
to the character of the land had been made, and that, there-
fore, the Department of the Interim', had not lost its juris-
diction over the land, and the original inquiry ordered by 
the Land Department as to the character of the land was 
subject to a reopening. The cases above cited all stand for 
the proposition that a patent is conclusive as to the character 
of the land, but do not all involve situations in which the 
mining claim came into existence after the securing of an 
agricultural patent. 
The majority opinion states that" a patent, however, issued 
merely on the basis of an ex parte hearing on behalf of the 
claimant to the land can in no way abrogate the existing 
vested extralateral rights of parties who had nothing to do 
with the proceedings." The facts in the cases cited in sup-
port of this proposition are not similar to the case at bar, but 
concern conflicts between mining claimants as to the owner-
ship of extralateral veins. They hold that at the issuance 
of a patent all surface rights are determined, but that a 
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patent does not necessarily determine all underground con-
flicts as between mineral claimants. 
In my opinion the evidence in this case is not sufficient to 
prove that the owners of the Pennsylvania and Jefferson 
mines had followed their veins extralaterally to a point 
where they penetrated the Ames Tract at the time of the 
issuance of patent thereto. Assuming for the time being, 
however, that such be the case, it seems to me that the fact 
that the alleged owners of said veins had knowledge of their 
eXIstence and their location, makes out an even stronger case 
for the plaintiffs, for they sat idly by and permitted the 
. railroad company to secure a patent to said lands as being 
. nonmineral, when, if said alleged owners had asserted their 
claim to the same, the railroad company would have been 
permitted, in fact required,' to select lieu lands in their stead 
-lands to which it unquestionably would have obtained a 
common law fee title extending to the center of the earth-
and therefore, defendant should now be estopped to claim 
that the character of the land to which it now lays claim 
could not be determined in a mere ex parte hearing. 
The grants in aid of railroads were not mere gratuities, 
they were designed to be compensation for the building of 
roads, and the mining claimants here, by their negligence or 
indolence let the railroad company take lands which allegedly 
included their extralateral veins, then causing them to lose 
thei:r right to select lieu lands in their stead. 
It is unfortunate, of course, if the mineral claimants lose 
a .portion of their mineral vein. But it is unfortunate also 
that the agricultural patentee should suffer. In rendering a 
decision between the two, it is my opinion that the party 
who has the knowledge and means of protecting his own 
rights but slept on them, must be the loser, and not the inno-
cent party who acted to the best of his knowledge and in 
good faith. 
By way of justification for its predecessor's inertia in not 
protecting the right to which it now lays claim, defendant 
points out that adverse proceedings are permitted only in 
case of surface conflicts; and that protest likewise would not 
have been recognized because the Land Department has no 
jurisdiction to determine underground conflicts in the issu-
ance of patents to public lands. 
.~ 
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In the first place, ",dverse proceedings are proper only be-
tween rival mining claimants, and, even if that were not 
true, had defendant's mining claim been located on the rail-
road land which was open to location at any time prior to 
patent, the lands would have been removed from the grant 
and such proceedings would have been unnecessary. Since 
notice by publication must be given before patent is issued, 
defendant's predecessor had at least constructive knowledge 
that such patent was about to issue and counsel for defend-
ant do not negative that fact in their briefs. Having knowl-
edge of the extension of its vein under the plaintiffs' land, 
and notice that a nonmineral patent was about to issue 
thereon, defendant's predecessor then had two avenues by 
which it might have protected its extralateral right. It 
might either have entered upon the railroad land and located 
a mineral claim thereon prior to patent, or it might have 
"protested" the issuance of the patent to the railroad com-
,pany. That protesting the issuance of patent is a proper 
method of securing a determination as to the character of 
land is well borne out by the following authorities: 
According to Costigan on Mining Law (p. 387), "a pro-
test may be filed at any time prior to the issuance of patent 
by any person who alleges a state of facts which should pre-
vent the issuance of a patent. Except in the case of an ex-
cluded co-owner, the office of a protest is to show that the 
land claimed is not the kind it is represented to be, or that 
the applicant has failed to comply with the law in a matter 
which would, avoid the claim." 
Quoting from Lindley on Mines (3d ed.), at page, 1752, I 
find the statement that: 
"Often a protestant is a mere volunteer, an amicus curiae, 
who calls the attention of the department to an alleged non-
compliance with the law on the part of the applicant, which 
otherwise might be overlooked, or raises the issues as to the 
character of the land, in the ultimate determination of which 
issue the protestant mayor may not have an interest proxi-
mate or remote;" and on page 1757, in discussing section 
2325 of the Revised Statutes [30 U. S. C. A. 29], said au-
thority states: 
, 'While controversies over the character of the land are 
not subjects of adverse claims under the sections of the Re-
vised Statutes under consid,eration, they are, however, the 
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subject of protest in any proceeding where title to public 
land is sought to be acquired, and where such issue is raised, 
it is the duty of the department to see that the lands are 
disposed of according to the law governing the quality of the 
lands under consideration." 
In the case of German Ins. 00. v. Hayden, 21 Colo. 127 
[40 Pac. 453, 52 Am. St. Rep. 206, 210], after quoting sec-
tion 2325, United States Revised Statutes, to the effect that 
no objection to the issuance of a patent shall be heard "ex-
cept it be shown that the applicant has failed to comply with 
the terms of this chapter", the court said: 
"The standing of the protestant seems to be regulated by 
the exception in the paragraph last quoted. The statement 
that he is not a party and therefore not entitled to appeal, 
is immaterial to the real question at issue. The law does not 
knowingly. permit a claimant to obtain patent under the 
mineral laws to agricultural lands, and, when a patent is ap-
plied for, it is quite unimportant as to how the attention of 
the land department may be called to the character of the 
land sought to be patented. That department certainly has 
the right to make necessary rules governing the manner in 
which the character of the land shall be made to appear both 
prima facie and ultimately, and if these rules are not com-
plied with, or if it appears that the land is not such as can 
be entered under the particular claim advanced, as for in-
stance, where agricultural lands are applied for under the 
mining laws, it is not only the province but the duty of the 
land department to deny the entry. It should be unneces~ 
sary to cite authorities in support of the foregoing, but as 
the contrary has been seriously urged in this case, we cite 
the following cases: Lindsey v. Hawes, 2 Black, 554 [17 
L. Ed. 265] ; Pierce v. Frace, 2 Wash. 81 [26 Pac. 192, 807] ; 
Harkness v. Underhill, 1 Black, 316 [17 L. Ed. 208]; Mc-
Arthy [McOarthy] v. Main [Mann], 19 Wall. 20 [22 L. Ed. 
49].) " 
If defendant's predecessor had taken advantage of either 
of the two methods open to it to preserve its claims, the rail-
road company would also have been protected, for upon 
withdrawal of the Ames land from its grant, the company 
would have been entitled to select other lands in lieu of those 
withdrawn. But, the mining company, having knowledge of 
the existence of the vein which it claimed, made no attempt 
~ 
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to protect its claim. By this neglect it deprived the railroad 
company of the lieu lands which it might have selected, and 
now asserts that it is the owner of the vein Which underlies 
the surface of the railroad company's land. I can reach 
but one conclusion from these facts, that the defendant's 
predecessor slept on its rights and that defendant now is 
estopped to come in and cla,im them to the detriment of the 
plaintiffs. 
Let us assume an illustration for the purpose of demon-
strating a situation which might exist if the position con-
tended for by defendant and adopted by the majority opin-
ion is correct. 
" A" locates a mining claim on unpatented land. Shortly 
thereafter, "B" files an application for a homestead on a 
quarter-section of land adjacent to "A's" mining claim. 
" A" proceeds to develop his mining claim and "B" his 
homestead. "B" proves up on his homestead and' obtains a 
patent thereto from the government. "A" files no contest 
or protest against the patenting of the land to "B". Years 
after" B" obtains his patent, "A" finds that in following the 
vein which apexed on his mining claim, it penetrates "B's" 
agricultural land. The extraction of ore from this vein on 
"B 's" land, mayor may not interfere with the use and en-
joyment of "B 's" land. 
Query. As a matter of justice and equity or even public 
policy, should "A" be permitted to mine and extract gold 
from "B 's" land, which had been conclusively determined 
to be nonmineral land at the time patent was issue to "B" Y 
Answer. I think not. I believe that a rule more conso-
nant with justice and equity would require" A" to pay" B" 
for the privileg·e of mining on "B 's" land if sufficient gold 
is found thereon to justify mining operations. The fact 
that "A" located his mining claim before "B" filed his 
homestead application, should not give" A" the right to fol-
low the dip of a vein apexing on his mining claim into" B 's" 
agricultural land. 'rhe situation presented in the case at 
bar is substantially the same as that contained in the above 
illustration, and I am not persuaded that there are any con-
siderations of equity, justice, or public policy, to justify the 
extension of the extralateral right doctrine so as to permit 
the owner of a vein apexing on a mining claim to follow the 
same on its dip into land conclusively determined to be non-
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mineral land even though such determination is made after 
the discovery and location of the mining claim on which said 
vein apexes. 
The doctrine of extralateral rights is well recognized be-
tween mines and mining proprietors. As between them, I do 
not mean to disturb long established rules. On the other 
hand, such extralateral right is pur(,\ly statutory. The com-
mon law would give to each claimant all ore bodies beneath 
the surface of his tract. It is a special privilege or excep-
tional right which is conferred by statute as an incidental of 
a valid lode location. It is my view that such special right 
should be confined and limited to the field in which it was 
intended to operate and in which it creates no injustice be-
cause of its reciprocal character. 
As to mining proprietors, each takes his property antici-
pating that veins apexing thereon may extend extralaterally 
into the land of others, and that the veins of others may in 
like manner pierce his boundaries. But the agricultural 
patentee expects to acquire a common law fee in his land 
conferring complete ownership therein to the center of the 
earth. Therefore, those who claim extralateral rights in 
public lands which are being patented as nonmineral lands 
owe a duty to inform the General Land Office of said claim. .:.;: 
I do not mean to say here that owners of mining claims 
are put on notice to protect their extralateral vein from every. 
one who seeks to patent the land which overlies them. As 
to mining patentees, that is, of course, unnecessary. How-
ever, the means of ascertaining the extent and direction of 
his mineral veins, if not the actual knowledge, is within the 
power of the mineral claimant. It, is upon him therefore 
that there devolves the duty of giving notice to the General 
Land Office about to issue a patent conveying a common law 
fee to the land overlying said veins that he claims a mineral 
right therein and that a nonmineral patent thereto should not 
issue, unless, of course, by some specific agreement the extra-
lateral rights therein are to be excepted or reserved. 
In view of the fact that most grants of public lands ex-
cept mineral lands, and mineral rights therein may be pro-
tected by the methods hereinabove men,tioned, no great hard-
ship is inflicted upon mining claimants by requiring them to 
notify the Land Office of their claims and thus prevent unin-
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tcntional error on the part of the government officials, and 
hardship to innocent purchasers of agricultural lands. 
The majority opinion states: "The subsurface of the Ames 
tract being clearly mineral could not pass under the terms 
of the Act but remained in the Government, and the Pennsyl-
vania and Jefferson mines received full extralateral rights to 
mine therein by virtue of the Mining Act of July 26, 1866." 
The majority opinion further states: "It is well established 
that the government cannot convey away land which it no 
longer owns and that a patent cannot cut off previously exist-
ing vested rights in the patented property." It is obvious 
that the last statement quoted above is in direct conflict with 
the first quoted statement; that is, in the first statement 
above quoted, the majority opinion states that the title to 
the mineral bearing subsurface of the Ames Tract remained 
in the g'overnment at the time it conveyed the Ames Tract 
to the railroad company, and in the last statement quoted 
above the majority opinion states that such mineral bearing 
subsurface had already vested in the owner of the mining 
claims. 
The case of Reynolds v. Iron Silver Mining 00., 116 U. S. 
687 [6 Sup. Ct. 601, 29 L. Ed. 774], cited by the majority 
opinion as authority for the last statement quoted above, is 
not helpful because the court therein decided under a statute 
which provided that where a vein or lode was known to exist 
within the boundaries of a placer claim, application for 
patent which did not include application for the vein or lode 
should be construed as a declaration that the claimant had no 
right of possession of the vein or lode claim, that the jury 
already had determined that the patentees of the placer claim 
knew at the time of application for patent of the existence 
of the lode and did not claim the lode in said application and 
therefore were precluded from subsequently exerting title 
thereto. 
The fundamental error in the majority opinion is that it 
in effect holds that the government reserved the mineral 
in the Ames Tract when it conveyed the same to the railroad 
company. This holding is contrary to all of the decisions 
rendered by the Supreme Oourt of the United States in 
the past eighty years and to all of the decisions of this 
court with the exception of the cases of Van Ness v. Rooney, 
supraJ Brown v. Luddy, supra~ and Ohicago Quartz Mining 
': I 
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00. v. Oliver, supra, which, as pointed out hereinabove, were 
decided upon a theory which has been disapproved by the 
Supreme Court of the United States. 
If both tracts of land had been mineral, it is elementary 
that each would have had the right to follow into the lands 
of the other, the extralateral dip of veins which apexed 
within their respective boundaries, and this without regard 
to the priority of the patents. But the reciprocal right to 
so follow mineral veins extralaterally is characteristic of 
mineral lands only. 
That mineral veins extending extralaterally may' not be 
followed into landiil conveyed by prior agricultural patents 
has already been determined. The Supreme Court of Ore-
gon in Reeves v. Oregon Exploration 00., 127 Or. 686 [273 
Pac. 389, 391], commented on the right to follow an extra-
lateral vein into agricultural lands previously patented un-
der the Timber and Stone Act of June 3, 1878, in the follow-
ing manner: 
"We find no merit in the contention that defendant has 
the same right to follow its vein under the surface of plain-
tiffs' land that it would have had if plaintiffs' land had 
been acquired under the mining laws. The right of a junior 
lode claimant, whether his claim be patented or unpatented, 
to follow the dip of his vein into an adjoining patented or 
unpatented lode claim, is one which arises under the min-
ing laws, and is confined to titles acquired under the mining 
laws, and has no application to a case where the vein of a 
lode claim on its dip extends into lands the title to which 
has been acquired under agricultural patents. Between lode 
claimants the right of one to pursue his vein on its dip 
under the surface of the other is recognized by the courts. 
Sec Lindley on Mines (3d ed.), sec. 611, and authorities cited. 
But such right is not recognized by the courts as between 
a . lode claimant and an agricultural claimant, whose title 
was acquired under a grant made prior to the location of 
the lode claim. We think that this particular question is 
settled by the decision of Judge Sawyer in Amador-Medean 
Gold Min. 00. v. South Spring Hill Gold M'in. 00. (C. C.), 
36 Fed. [668], 669, 13 Sawy. 523. The doctrine announced 
in that case has been recognized as the law for more than 
50 years and we have been cited to no case holding to a 
! 
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contrary doctrine." (See, also, Anaconda Oopper Mining 
00. v. Pilot-Butte Min. 00., 52 Mont. 165 [156 Pac. 409].) 
To my mind, the whole fallacy of the majority opinion 
lies in the fact that it ignores the sanctity of a patent and 
the security which the obtaining of a patent is supposed 
to give a patentee. 
I believe, there is nothing more important in our economic 
system than the certainty of the title under which real 
property in private ownership is held. Rules applicable 
to the determination of such titles should be so entrenched 
in our legal and economic systems that they should not be 
subject to change or variation or rendered uncertain by 
judicial decision of this or any other court. When a person 
receives a conveyance of land predicated upon a patent is-
sued by the government of the United States containing no 
reservations or restrictions, he should be able to rest secure 
in the belief that he is the owner of such land and that his 
right to exercise all of the incidents of ownership, occupation, 
possession and use thereof cannot be challenged by anyone 
not in privity with his legal or equitable title. If the majority 
opinion in this case is permitted to stand, it will remove from 
the arch of title structure the keystone which renders that 
structure safe and secure. 
It has long been the policy of the courts of this state and 
of the Supreme Court of the United States to recognize the 
sacred title of a patentee. The Supreme Court of this state 
has many times reiterated its policy to regard as final and 
certain a title acquired ey patent. (See Saunders v. La 
Purisima etc. 00., 125 Cal. 159 [57 Pac. 656].) And in Gale 
v. Best, 78 Cal. 235, at 239 [20 Pac. 550, 12 Am. St. Rep. 
44], this court quoted with favor the words of Justice Field, 
in the case of Steel v. St. Louis Smelting & Ref. 00., 106 
U. S. 447 [1 Sup. Ct. 389, 27 L. Ed. 226] : 
"In Steel v. Smelting 00., supra, Justice Field, whose ex-
haustive opinion we cannot here undertake to reproduce, 
among other things, says as follows: 
" 'We have so often had occasion to speak of the Land 
Department, the object of its creation, and the p~wers it pos-
sesses in the alienation by patent of portions of the public 
lands, that it creates an unpleasant surprise to find that 
counsel, in discussing the effect to be given to the action 
of that department, overlook our decisions on the subject. 
1 
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That department, as we have repeatedly said, was estab-
lished to supervise the various proceedings whereby a con-
veyanceof the title from the United States to portions of 
the public domain is obtained, and to see that the requirements 
of different acts of Congress are fully complied with. Neces-
sarily, therefore, it must consider and pass upon the qualifica-
tions of the applicant, the acts he has performed to secure the 
title, the nature of the land, and whether it is of the class 
which is open to sale. Its judgment upon these matters is 
that of a special tribunal, and is unassailable except by direct 
proceedings for its annulment or limitation. Such has been 
the uniform language of this court in repeated decisions.' 
And again, speaki'ng of the lands held by the possessor of a 
patent, he says: 'If intruders upon them could compel him, 
in every suit for possession, to establish the validity of the 
action of the Land Department and the correctness of its 
rulings upon matters submitted to it, the patent, instead 0/ 
being a means of peace and security, would subject his rights 
to constant and ruinous litigation. He would recover one 
portion of his land if the jury were satisfied that the evidence 
produced justified the action of that department, and lose 
another portion, the title whereto rests upon the same facts, . 
because another jury came to a different conclusion. So his -!! 
rights in different suits upon the same patent would be deter-
mined, not by its efficacy as a conveyance of the government, 
but accordipg to the fluctuating prejudices of different jury-
men, or their varying capacities to weigh evidences.' (104 
U. ·S. 636, 641.) And the pith of the whole matter is aptly 
expressed by the same learned justice in Smelting 00. v. 
Kemp, 104U. S. 636 [26 L. Ed. 875], where, speaking of the 
land department, he says: 'Indeed, the doctrine as to the 
:regularity and validity of its acts, where it has jurisdiction, 
goes so far that if ~ any circumstances under existing law 
a patent would be held valid, it will be presumed that such cir-
cumstances existed.' " 
. If the 'rule that patents to railroad lands are conclusive as 
to their nonmineral character were otherwise, to quote from 
Judge Farrington's decision in Southern Development 00. v. 
Endersen, 200 Fed. 272, 275: 
"A title which today is valuable because the land is appar-
ently non-mineral tomorrow may become utterly void and 
worthless by reason of the discovery of mineral. Methods of 
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extraction and reduction may be devised of such cheapness 
and efficiency as to render mining highly profitable on lands 
which at the date of selection and listing, had and could have 
had no vaille for mineral purposes. The courts have never 
yielded to the argument that Congress intended to provide 
for titles so elusive." 
Therefore the answer to the statement in the majority opin-
ion that title to the vein underlying the Ames Tract had 
passed out of the hands of the government into the hands of 
mining locators is that that question was determined adversely 
to said locators by the issuance of the patent to the railroad 
company. If we do not take this view we place the patentee 
of land in the situation so' roundly condemned by Justice 
Field in the case of Steel v. Smelting 00., supra, where "his 
rights ... upon the same patent would be determined, not 
by its efficacy as a conveyance of the government, but ac-
cording to the fluctuating prejudices of different jurymen," 
That the patent so issued determined the mining locators' 
claiIns adversely to them is supported by the case of Thomas 
v. Horst, 54 Mont. 260 [169 Pac. 731], wherein a patent was 
issued to a railroad company subsequent to the location of 
quartz mining claims upon the same land. Instead of deter-
mining the character of each parcel of land at the time of 
patent, the character of all lands granted to the railroad com-
pany therein were classified by a commission under authority 
of an act of Congress, and notice of such classification was 
published prior to the issuance of patent. If no protest was 
filed, the classification was declared to be final except for 
fraud. This classification was held to have the same legal 
effect as a determination at the time of patent such as that 
held in Barden v. No. Pacific R. R. 00., supra, to be conclu-
sive. 
The court then said, "If lots 1 and 2 outside the limits of 
the Homestake claim were classified as nonmineral, and no 
protest was filed, or if protest was filed and, after hearing, 
was overruled, such classification, in the absence of fraud, 
became final, and settled for all time that the land was in 
fs-::t nonmineral in character .... 
"If we indulge the presumption declared by the Supreme 
Court that the issuance of patent is in the nature of a judicial 
determination, that every fact has been found which is neces-
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sary to entitle the patentee to the legal title to the land, the 
conclusion appears inevitable that the allegation in this com-
plaint that patent issued to the Northern Pacific is tantamount 
to an allegation that the land in controversy was duly classi-
fied as nonmineral, and the classification approved before tbl:: 
mineral claims were located and since the determination of 
the mineral or nonmineral character of the land presented a 
question of fact for decision by the land department, its judg-
ment thereon is conclusive upon the courts in the absence of 
fraud. 
"Of course, if the mIneral or nonmineral character of this 
land was open to investigation notwithstanding its classifica-
tion, then the allegation in the complaint that it was and is 
mineral land is sufficient to show that the land department 
was without jurisdiction to convey it to the railway company; 
but, as we have observed before, if the classification did not 
finally determine the character of this land, the utmost that 
can be said of it is that it was an idle ceremony, and the 
act of February 26, 1895, was a meaningless piece of legisla-
tion. " 
In conclusion, I desire to summarize the principles of law, 
which in my opinion are applicable to the case at bar, and ~ 
which, when applied to the facts of this case must result in a 
reversal of the judgment of the trial court in so far as it grants 
to the Pennsylvania mining claim extralateral rights in the 
Ames Tract. 
The Railroad Grant Act of July 25, 1866, created a present 
grant of nonmineral land to the railroad company; that is, 
the grant took effect as of that date, if and when the railroad 
company complied with the provisions of the act with refer-
ence to the location and construction of a railroad and filed 
its map of location with the General Land Office. The grant 
of such land remained a float until the filing of such map, 
and title thereupon vested in the railroad company subject to 
the. determination by the General Land Office as to whether 
or not said land was mineral or nonmineral in character. 
If the Land Office determined that any of the land covered 
by the grant was mineral in character, the same was excluded 
from the grant, and the railroad company was given other 
nonmineral land in lieu of the mineral land so excluded. If 
the Land Office determined that the land covered by the grant 
was nonmineral, and a patent was issued to the railroad com-
Jan. 1941.] AMES 11. EMPIRE STAR MINES Co., LTD. 257 
pany, the issuance of such patent conclusively determined the 
nonmineral character of the land, and the railroad company 
got a common law fee in the land granted, including all 
mineral deposited therein. Unless discovery of mineral in 
paying quantities was called to the attention of the govern-
ment officials before patent was issued to the railroad com-
pany, all claims to the mineral in such land was cut off by 
the issuance of such patent. The provision in a patent issued 
to a railroad company excepting mineral or mineral land from 
the grant was and is void, and the railroad company was 
granted a common law fee including all mineral deposits in 
the land upon the issuance of the patent. 
A valid mineral location gives to the locator the right to 
follow extralaterally on their dip downward all veins apexing 
on his claim which penetrate other mineral lands, but extra-
lateral rights do not exist in agricultural or nonminerallands. 
When the Land Office determined that the Ames Tract was 
nonmineral in character and the government issued a patent 
thereto to the railroad company, the latter was granted a com-
mon law fee in said land which related back to the date of 
the passage of the Railroad Grant Act of July 25, 1866, and 
cut qff all intervening rights of those asserting that said land 
was more valuable for mineral than nonmineral purposes. 
The defendant therefore is barred from asserting the right 
to extract mineral from the Ames Tract upon the theory that 
it may do so under the extralateral right doctrine. 
Defendant admits that the Jefferson title is not as "clear 
cut" as that to the Pennsylvania, but argues that once said 
title was in existence, it will be presumed to continue so until 
the contrary is proved. Although the Jefferson claim was 
relocated in 1891, and subsequently disputed by various claim-
ants, defendant states that it has acquired by various options 
and deeds or leases the rights of those rival claimants. In fur-
ther defense of its right to mine on the Jefferson vein, defend-
ant offers the "Ebert reservation", of'which it is the assignee. 
I find it unnecessary to give further consideration to the 
contentions of either party so far as the Jefferson claim is 
concerned, for the reason that the conclusion which I have 
reached as to defendant's right to follow extralaterally the 
dip of the vein apexing on the Pennsylvania claim is equally 
applicab~e to that of the J ef!erson claim. 
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The right of the defendant to follow the Jefferson vein 
on· its dip under the A.mes land is finally determined, how-
ever, upon a reservation in the deed from Ebert to A.mes 
hereinabove referred to as the" Ebert reservation; '. Under 
this reservation, Ebert reserved to himself, his successors and 
assigns, "the right to follow the Jefferson gold quartz ledge 
with its dip, and to mine and extract the ore from the same 
. in and upon said (the Ames) land, without disturbing the sur-
,face of said land". I am of the opinion that by this reserva-
tion, Ebert retained the right to follow the Jefferson vein 
. under the surface of the Ames land, and that this right was 
transferable. 
By mesne conveyances, defendant succeeded to the rights of 
.. Ebert, .und,er this reservation. Although it cannot be said 
'that defendant did thereby acquire an estate in' the lands of 
the plaintiffs, it did obtain the right to remove the ore fro~ 
said vein and title to the ore so mined. Since a right carries 
with it. the incidents necessary to its exercise, defendant has 
'a right of entry which constitutes a complete and ample de-
}ense to this action. 
Whether or not such right is exclusive is a matter of inter-
pretation depending in part on the intention of the parties 
and the surrounding circumstances at the time of the grant. 
For, the present, in the absence of evidence, I deem it neither 
necessary nor proper to reach a determination on that point. 
In view of the conclusion which I have reached in the fore-
going opinion, the judgment of the trial court should be 
reversed. 
A petition for a rehearing was denied February 27, 1941. 
Carter, J., voted for a rehearing. 
~ 
:''-'';'' 
Feb. 1941.] ESTATE OF RICHARDS. 259 
[Sac. No. 5263. In Bank.-February 3, 1941.J 
In the Matter of the Estate of PHILIP RICHARDS, De-
ceased. FRANK BENNALLACK, as Administrator, 
etc., Appellant, v. E. M. RECTOR, as Administrator 
With Will Annexed, etc., Respondent. 
[lJ Decedents' Estates-Executors and Administrators-Powers, 
Duties and Liabilities-Compromise-Compromise of Claims 
Against Estate-Application of Statute to Accounting;-Sec-
tion 578 of the Probate Code, authorizing the compromise of 
claims upon the approval of a petition therefor does not apply 
to the settlement of accouni;s of a personal representative. 
Until the entry of an order settling the account, there can be 
no determination of the amount due fNm the representative, 
and until that time there can be no basis for a petition or 
order of compromise. 
[2J Appeal and Error-Judgments and Orders Appealable-Or-
ders Relating to Judgment-Order Refusing to Vacate Judg-
ment or Order.-After the elapsing of the time within which 
to appeal from a judgment or order, an appeal frQnl a subse-
quent order refusing to set it aside is unavailing. 
[3J Decedents' Estates-Executors and Administrators-Compen_ 
sation-Extra Compensation-Services Compensated.-It can-
not be said (assuming the question open for consideration) 
that an allowance to a personal representative of $100 a year 
for extraordinary services rendered during a period of 47 
years is unreasonable, where they consisted of innumerable 
services in managing and selling several pieces of real prop-
erty, paying of many legacies, and delivering of bequests, and 
engaging in litigation. 
[4J Id.-Accounting and Settlement-Settlement-Conclusiveness 
""':'Collateral Attack-Want of Attorney's Authority to Stipu-
late.-The want of authority of an attorney to enter into a 
stipulation relative to the settlement of a personal representa-
tive's account does not render void the order of settlement, 
which is valid on its face, since the authority to settle ac-
counts is vested in the court free of control by the parties. 
Especially is this true as to a complaint of want of authority 
to stipulate for less than the sum on hand, where it appears 
2. See 2 Cal. Jur. 164. 
McK. Dig. References: 1. Decedents' Estates, § 195; 2. Appeal 
and Error, § 60; 3. Decedents' Estates, § 226; 4. Decedents' Es-
tates, § 911; 5. Decedents' Estates, § 1118. 
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